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INTRODUCTION

This 24th yearbook of our Thomas Institute once again addresses the topic of interreligious dialogue, in several respects. Over the years that have past, this topic has been of much interest in these pages, ever since our colleague and member of the editorial board of the Jaarboek Pim Valkenberg in 1997 introduced a project to study medieval ways of dialogue between Muslims, Jews and Christians. The project itself resulted in publication of a collection of studies in the Publications of the Thomas Instituut (The Three Rings, 2005), but the effort to ‘talk to strangers’ continues. Valkenberg, who recently published his magnum opus (Sharing Lights On the Way to God. Muslim-Christian Dialogue and Theology in the Context of Abrahamic Partnership, Amsterdam/New York 2006), inspired with his original essay, published in the Jaarboek 1997 (“How to talk to strangers. Aquinas and interreligious dialogue”), the study that opens the present collection of contributions: that of Syds Wiersma.

Syds Wiersma, member of our institute, is engaged in a PhD-project which is devoted to the Pugio Fidei, the main medieval work of interreligious polemics, written by Dominican friar Raymond Martin and published in 1278. Wiersma’s present contribution is his first large publication on the subject, and compares Aquinas’ theory of dialogue with the one that Raymond Martin put into practice, practice being his treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity, in his two major works. Wiersma’s study shows how important the subject of his research is, not only seen from the viewpoint of the theology of interreligious dialogue, but also for the correct understanding of the background of some of Aquinas’ works, and especially the conception of his Summa contra Gentiles. Wiersma argues for interpreting this work not as a manual for missionaries, but as a manual for the exposition of Christian doctrine in a way that is apologetically relevant. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is approached, by Raymond Martin, as a doctrine that should be explained to Muslims and Jews as a doctrine which builds on the
personal divine properties or *middot*, being *potentia*, *sapientia* and *voluntas/bonitas*.

Wiersma originally presented his study as a paper on the third international conference of the Thomas Institute, in December 2006. The present contribution, however, was rewritten after discussions both at the conference and thereafter.

The other studies that are contained in this volume have a relationship with the conference as well. All scholars were either present at the conference, or intended to (Abderrazak Douay, unfortunately absent because of illness).

Görge Hasselhoff, teaching at the Evangelisch-Theologische Fakultät of the University of Bonn, expert in the field of the reception of 'Moses Maimonides' (as he was called later in the first centuries after his death), focuses on the expression *Rabbi Moyses* in Aquinas' writings. As it turns out, whenever Maimonides is mentioned explicitly, his ideas are rejected by Aquinas, but when he is not mentioned at all, he plays an important positive role in the formation of Aquinas' exposition of the Christian doctrine of God.

Closing the major section of this *Jaarboek* devoted to interreligious dialogue, Abderrazak Douay addresses the modern Arabic world. Douay, professor of philosophy at the University Mohamed V, Rabat, Morocco, studies the way in which modern Arab thinkers interpret Aquinas' philosophical views on God. Douay considers Arab translations of Aquinas' writings, as well as seven modern Arab philosophers who have been interpreting Aquinas. We are very grateful to dr. Douay for introducing us to this area of research.

Fainche Ryan, attached to the Margaret Beaufort Institute in Cambridge, recently finished her PhD-thesis in Rome on Aquinas' conception of *Sacra Doctrina*. The topic of her contribution, "Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas" is quite dear to the Thomas Instituut of Utrecht: Aquinas on naming God. After introducing us to the subject, Ryan focuses on three names that are mentioned in the latter articles of question 13 of the first part of the *Summa Theologiae*: God, 'Qui est', and 'Tetragrammaton'.

The last of the five studies contained in this volume, is written by David Burrell, emeritus professor of theology and philosophy of the University of Notre Dame. His contribution bears
the character of an extended book review, introducing us to Denys Turner's *Faith, Reason and the Existence of God* (Cambridge 2004), with his provocative insight that the provability of the existence of God is a tenet of Christian faith. Part of this contribution was published in *Modern Theology* as well, but Burrell employed it to address the conference of our Institute in December 2005, reason for which we wanted it to be available to the readership of the *Jaarboek*.

As usual the *Jaarboek* finishes with the Annual Report, written by our secretary of studies, Cristina Pumplun. The report contains an interesting overview of the conference just mentioned.

Last year I closed with a remark on the Dutch catholic theological institutes. By now we know that the institutes of Tilburg and Utrecht will merge and continue as the one major academic and canonical education in catholic theology in the Netherlands. This means that as of July 1 of 2006, Utrecht will be part of the larger University of Tilburg, and this applies to the Thomas Instituut as well. For now, we do not expect major consequences for the work and the location of our institute.

Once again I would like to express our gratitude to all who have been sympathetic to our work, and have been important for us, in any way, in the year past. Working on the *Jaarboek* is a pleasure, even though we do not seem able to succeed in our yearly ambition to publish it before the summer, instead of after it. Most important is, that it is published, this year for the 24th time.

July 14, 2006
Henk J.M. Schoot
Editor-in-Chief
1. Introduction

In his latest introduction to the *Summa contra Gentiles*, René-Antoine Gauthier argues that the "légende missionnaire" – as he calls the tradition based on the testimony of Peter Marsilius, that Thomas Aquinas wrote this *summa* at the request of Raymond de Peñaafort – must be false. The idea that the creation of the *summa* had anything to do with De Peñaafort's missionizing efforts on the different groups of *infideles* (heretics, Jews, Muslims and pagans) in Spain and North Africa is dismissed by Gauthier as a misunderstanding of the very nature of what pushed Thomas to write it. Gauthier holds that it is "l'oeuvre la plus personelle de saint Thomas, non pas provoquée par une intervention accidentelle et exterieure".¹

Gauthier's argument was and is disputable. Especially Fernand Van Steenberghen and Petrus Marc criticized his degradation of Marsilius's testimony to a mere legend.² They note that the text of Marsilius only says, that De Peñaafort asked Thomas

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to "compose a work against the errors of the infideles", and that in those days the word *infideles* connoted all groups erring from the truth of Catholic faith. Marsilius, in other words, was perfectly in accordance with what is probably the authentic title of the *summa*: *Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium*. Both scholars admit that Thomas wrote a work which transcended the concrete Iberian missionary context and which would benefit all Christian thinkers who were faced with unbelief of any kind, but both note as well that this fact does not exclude the possibility of an initial request from De Peñafort. They draw attention to the rest of Marsilius’s testimony on the life of De Peñafort, in which he shows himself a reliable chronicler.³

Laureano Robles suggested to view the *Summa contra Gentiles* within the context of the Dominican *studia linguarum*.⁴ He leaves open the possibility that a request may have been initiated by the need of suitable theological manuals for these schools. The *studia linguarum* were founded in provinces where many Jews and Muslims were living (Spain, Greece, the Holy Land, Syria) and in

³ The testimony of Marsilius appears in his chronicle on James I, king of Aragon (1213-1276), which dates from 1314. In this chronicle Marsilius has three chapters on the life of Raymond de Peñafort (chs. 47-49 of book IV). The discussed passage reads as follows: "Conversionem etiam infidelium ardenter desiderans rogavit eximium doctorem sacre pagine magistrum in theologia fratrem Tomam de Aquino eiusdem ordinis, qui inter omnes huius mundi clericos post fratrem Albertum philosophum maximus habebatur: ut opus aliquod faceret contra infidelium errores [...] Fecit magister ille quod tanti patris humilis deprécatio requirebat: et summam que contra gentiles intitulatur [...]" Cf. Fr. Balme, C. Paban, *Raymundiana seu Documenta quae pertinent ad S. Raimundi de Pennaforti vitam et scripta* (Monumenta Ordinis Fr. Praedicatorum historica, VI 1), Rome 1898, 12; Gauthier (1993), o.c., 168.

missionary areas (North Africa, the Orient in general). Already in 1236, at the general chapter of Paris, master-general Jordan of Saxony said: “We demand that in all provinces and convents friars learn the languages of their neighbours.” Raymond de Peñaforre was a main stimulator of language schools for Arabic and Hebrew on the Iberian Peninsula and in North Africa. It is important to note that these *studia* were not language schools in a strict sense. The friars were also educated in the beliefs and traditions of the people among which they lived or were to preach. They studied their holy books and authoritative writers. Moreover, they were thoroughly educated in Scripture and Christian doctrine. The double aim Thomas elaborated in the *Summa contra Gentiles* – on the one hand manifesting the truth, on the other hand refuting the errors against the truth – accords with the aim and program of these *studia linguarum*. Humbert of Romans, master-general of the Dominicans from 1254-1263, urged that the order ought to have a special concern and fervent zeal for pagans, Saracens, Jews, heretics, schismatics and all who were outside the church, “and therefore the order should take care always to have treatises against their errors, which stimulate the friars to train themselves adequately, and to have competent friars who in suitable places labour to learn Arabic, Hebrew, Greek or barbaric languages.”

This paper will not focus on the aim of the *Summa contra Gentiles*. A satisfying answer to that will perhaps never be given, simply because after an age of intensive historical research the decisive evidence is still lacking. A topic, however, related to it and possibly even shedding light on it, is that of the early reception of the

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6 Marsilius’s text reads as follows: “Studia linguarum pro fratribus sui Ordinis Tunicii et Murciae statuit, ad quae fratres cathalanos electos destinari procuravit, qui in multum fructum animarum profecerunt et in suae decoratum speculum nationis.” Quoted in *L. Robles* (1992), o.c., 90.

7 The Latin text is quoted in A. Cortabarria (1970), o.c., 197, n. 4 and in *A. Robles Sierra* (1990), o.c., 19, n. 42: “Et ideo curandum est ut semper in ordine sint aliqui tractatus contra errores eorum, in quibus fratres exercitare se valeant competenter; et ut aliqui fratres idonei insudent in locis idoneis ad linguam arabicam, hebraicam, graecam et barbaras addiscendas.”
My paper is about one of the earliest recipients, who was closely connected with De Peñafor te and his missionary project: Raymond Martin (Latin: Raimundus Martini; Catalan: Ramón Marti). In the first part of his maturest work, the Pugio Fidei (1278), Raymond incorporated more than 150 quotations from the summa. Laureano Robles did a fine job in listing all the parallels and contributing convincingly to a discussion already started at the beginning of the twentieth century, on the question whether Raymond quoted Thomas or vice versa.

The first part of the Pugio Fidei, in which the quotations from the summa occur, has mainly a 'philosophical' character and does not fulfil the central goal of the work: to serve as a manual for friars who were to preach to and to missionize among rabbinic Judaism. This goal is executed in part II and III of the Pugio. The influence of the summa on these two 'theological' parts, especially on part III, which resembles the structure of the 'theological' part IV of the summa, has hardly been studied. Such a comparison may nevertheless be promising, especially when it would not limit itself

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8 Or Pugio Christianorum as it is called in the oldest manuscripts.
9 L. Robles Carcedo, En torno a una vieja polémica: el 'Pugio Fidei' y Tomás de Aquino, in Revista Espanyola de Teologia 34 (1974), 321-350; ibid. 35 (1975), 21-341. (The first six sections of chapter 10 of Tomás de Aquino (1992), 121-170 are a reprint of these two articles). From the observation that Raymond's texts are more extensive, quoting additional sources and identifying sources in the case Thomas neglected such identifications, Robles's conclusion is that Raymond depends on Thomas, that he amplified the quotations and adapted them to the presentation of his own argument. On the other hand, Robles notes, Raymond's writings show that he was a keen transmitter of Arabic and Hebrew literature. A part of the Arabic and Hebrew texts, which occur in Raymond's writings, we encounter as well in Thomas's. Here, Robles concludes, it must have been the other way around: Thomas being dependent on Raymond and Raymond providing Thomas with translations he could possibly use.
10 Part I is above all a refutation of what Raymond considered as the errors of philosophy. It treats i.a. three important questions in the debate between philosophy and theology of those days: (1) on the eternity of the world; (2) on God's knowledge of the singularia or particularia; (3) on the resurrection general. Part II wants to prove (mainly from Hebrew Scripture), when the Messiah must have come and that the prophets characterized him as Jesus Christ was pictured in the New Testament. Part III wants to demonstrate (again mainly from Hebrew Scripture) the doctrinal tenets of Christianity.
to a literal level, but would extend itself to the level of theological method and doctrinal and scriptural content. Several aspects should be considered. Firstly, the composition and the structuring theological principles behind both works. Secondly, their use of Scripture and reason, and the governing view on the relation between reason and faith. Thirdly, their presentation of Christian doctrine and the question, which errores discussed by Thomas appear as well in Raymond’s discussion with rabbinic Judaism, and whether we can detect examples of transfer from the Summa contra Gentiles to the Pugio Fidei.

This paper will give the first results of my comparison between the Summa contra Gentiles and the Pugio Fidei on a theological level. It will start where Thomas starts: in the introductory chapters, where he describes the plan and composition of the work. Thomas presents here also some rules for a ‘dialogue’ with the infideles: pagans, Muslims, Jews and heretics. After having presented these rules and their epistemic and apologetic presuppositions, my paper will turn to Raymond. It will show how he presents the Trinity in discussion with Judaism. I have chosen to highlight Raymond’s exposition on the Trinity for several reasons. Firstly, because for both authors the Trinity is the first doctrine to treat when entering the realm which exceeds human reason, the realm of faith. Secondly, because the two treatises Raymond wrote on the Trinity serve as an excellent illustration of how he put into practice the epistemic and apologetic rules Thomas formulated in the Summa contra Gentiles. And thirdly, because the Trinitarian treatise of the Pugio Fidei is a good illustration of Raymond’s own strategy for the discussion with the Jews and therefore is a good introduction to his thinking. Finally, the paper will give some conclusions from these first comparative steps.

To reassure the reader, the conclusion will not be that Marsilius was right and the Summa contra Gentiles was written for the Dominican mission at the request of De Peñafort. That would be a neglect of the broader view of the summa, which even the

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11 It is striking that Raymond does only quote the Summa contra Gentiles in the first part of the Pugio. There is one exception: in chapter 5 of the third distinction of the PF III, in which Raymond responds to Jewish rationes against the incarnation, there are some parallels with ScG IV, c. 41. Cf. Marc (1967), o.c., 60-61.
defenders of Marsilius have pointed out, as well as an impossible answer to a rather trivial historical question. My interest is not in what or who pushed Thomas to write the *summa*, but in how the *summa* served other thinkers within the order. One of these earliest others was Thomas’s fellow friar Raymond Martin. I will first give now a short introduction to his life and works.

2. Life and works of Raymond Martin

Little is known of Raymond’s life. A few facts can be found in his writings, the Acts of the Provincial Chapters of the Spanish Dominicans and references in contemporary documents. Historians have tried to reconstruct Raymond’s life by combining these few facts with more general facts about the history of Dominican mission and language schools in the 13th century.

Raymond was born in a village called Subirats near Barcelona. His signature, found on a 1284 act in the Dominican convent in Barcelona, is the last trace of his life. In 1292 Arnald of Vilanova wrote his *Allocutio super Tetragrammaton*. He praised Raymond for “sowing the seed of the Hebrew language in the garden

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12 Some royal decrees, the mentioned chronicle of Peter Marsilius on the life of king James I of Aragon (1314), an act from the Dominican convent in Tarragona with Raymond’s signature, the first page of Arnald of Vilanova’s *Allocutio super Tetragrammaton*, in which Arnald gives praise to his former teacher in Hebrew.


of my heart”, and it seems he is honouring Raymond here as his late teacher. If we decide to believe the tradition of Peter Marsilius, who writes in his chronicle on the life of king James I, that Raymond died in Barcelona at an advanced age, completing his fiftieth year in the order, then we must conclude that Raymond entered the order somewhere between 1234 and 1242 and that he probably was born in the second decade of the century.

In the acts of the Toledo Provincial Chapter of 1250, Raymond is mentioned among eight friars who are selected to be sent to a studium arabicum. This school, of which the acts do not mention the site, probably must be located at Tunis or Mallorca. In 1257 Raymond finished his Explanatio Symboli Apostolorum ad Institutionem Fidelium, a defense of the Apostles’ Creed, probably written for Christians who lived within a Muslim environment or who were confronted with Muslim arguments. In this Arabic period, Raymond wrote another work, De Seta Machometi (litt.: On the Muhammadan sect), which is partly identical with, partly complementary to the Explanatio. In both works Raymond refutes the Muslim claim that Jewish and Christian Scriptures were falsified. In the De Seta Machometi, Raymond moreover contests that Muhammad was a true prophet. In the Explanatio, he gives an explanation of the tenets of Christian faith and refutes some Muslim objections against it. Part of the strategy of both works are, what Raymond calls, argumenta ab hoste, arguments in favour of Christian truths, or to the detriment of objections against it, taken from sources which are authoritative for the adversary. In the case of the De Seta Machometi and the Explanatio, these sources are the Koran and Arabic philosophy. A similar strategy was followed later in the Pugio Fidei, where Hebrew Scripture and rabbinic sources are brought forward to refute Jewish claims against Christian exegesis or

15 J. Carreras (1949), o.c., 80.
16 For this passage, cf. A. Robles Sierra (1990), o.c., 9.
17 For a recent survey on the discussion about the site of this studium, cf. E. Colomer (1994), o.c., 234-237.
18 The work was edited by I. March y Batllés, Ramón Martí y la seva Explanatio simboli apostolorum, in Anuari del Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 1908, 443-496.
doctrine, or to show that parts of Jewish tradition corroborate Christian faith.\textsuperscript{19}

In 1264, a few months after the famous Disputation of Barcelona (1263), we find Raymond back in Barcelona, where he is appointed as a member of a royal commission of five in Aragon, which was to judge charges of blasphemy against Christ and Mary in rabbinic literature.\textsuperscript{20} In 1267 he finished his \textit{Capistrum Iudaeorum} (‘Bridle for the Jews’), an extensive argument to prove that the Messiah had already come and should be identified with Jesus Christ, consisting of two parts (seven reasons and seven refutations), using scriptural proof texts and passages from rabbinic literature.\textsuperscript{21} But Raymond’s opus magnum is without any doubt the \textit{Pugio Fidei}, finished in 1278.\textsuperscript{22} In the oldest manuscript, ms. 1,405 of the St. Geneviève library in Paris, the \textit{Pugio} is a work of more than 400
AQUINAS’ THEORY ON DIALOGUE

folia, laced with many quotations from Hebrew Scripture and rabbinic tradition. The Pugio was primarily meant as a manual for Christian missionaries and preachers working among the Jews and it might have been written in view of the studium hebraicum, which the Dominicans established in their convent in Barcelona. In 1281 the Estella Provincial Chapter assigned Raymond as the lecturer of this Hebrew school.

So Raymond was an important pawn in De Peñafort’s ‘dream of conversion’. He learned Arabic and Hebrew, he studied the Koran, Muslim tradition and philosophy, Hebrew Scripture and rabbinic tradition. He studied Jewish books and censored them. He wrote treatises for Christians living among Muslims and Jews, and missionary manuals for his fellow friars. He lectured at the studia. He debated, as the Pugio attests, on streets and marketplaces with Jews and Muslims. He probably preached in synagogues and mosques. He was, as Marsilius noted, “a very gifted person, a cleric competent in Latin, a philosopher versed in Arabic philosophy, a great rabbi and master in Hebrew and very learned in the Aramaic language [...] and not only the king [James I], but also saint Louis, the king of France, and that good king of Tunis esteemed him highly.

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and were on close terms with him. This text, and others, have led historians to suggest that Raymond was an ambassador for king James during the preparations for the crusade of 1270, which ended in a disaster before the coast of Tunis, and in the death of king Louis. They picture Raymond negotiating with the caliph of Tunis in 1269, trying to convert him to Christianity, and they see him travelling that same year to Paris, persuading the king to participate in the crusade. It is suggested as well that Raymond joined friar Paul Christian (Pablo Christiani) in Paris, who seems to have been the Christian spokesman during the so-called second Parisian disputation in 1269. This leaves open the possibility of a meeting with Thomas Aquinas as well. Petrus Marc has dated the Summa contra Gentiles in Thomas's second Parisian regency (1269-1272). With this

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29 A large part of his introduction serves to develop this thesis. Raymond Martin is also part of it. Marc holds that when Thomas brings forward the miraculous spread of Christianity as an argument of the Christian truth and refers to Muhammad and Islam as an example of the opposite (ScG I, c. 6), he builds on Raymond’s Capistrum Iudaeorum (I, ratio 7), which was published in 1267. This serves as one of Marc’s arguments for dating the summa after 1269. Cf. P. Marc (1967), 65-69. In my opinion this part of the argument is not very strong. We know that Raymond was concerned with the study of Arabic and Islam in the fifties. Robles Carcedo suggests, very reasonably, that Raymond served his order i.a. by translating Arabic
theory in mind it is possible to read Marsilius's testimony in a different way: Raymond Martin may have been the transmitter of De Penafort's request to Thomas. Or, a variant within this theory, formulated by Gérge Hasselhoff: "In my view it should be taken into consideration that, in addition to the literary exchange, an oral exchange between the two Dominican monks must also have occurred during this Parisian period."  

The idea that Thomas and Raymond knew each other personally is very old. In his introduction to the reprint of Joseph de Voisin's edition of the Pugio Fidei (1651), J.B. Carpzov includes a letter, which Yvo Pinsart, prior of the Saint Jacques convent in Paris, wrote to De Voisin. Pinsart mentions Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Raymond Martin in one breath. This passage leaves room for the interpretation that Thomas and Raymond studied together in Paris at Albert's feet. If they were indeed fellow students - and it is impossible to be sure of it, since we have no document that confirms the tradition - the two must have met between 1245 and 1248, because Albert and Thomas left to Cologne in 1248.

Concerning the suggestion that Raymond came to Paris in 1269, as well as the tradition that Thomas and Raymond knew each other personally, the words of Joseph Schatzmiller are very true: "[...] on aimerait pourtant avoir des preuves plus solide d'une telle éventualité."}

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philosophers and transmitting their ideas i.a. to Thomas. See my note 5. If so, he may also have transmitted his view on Muhammad and Islam. In fact he did, at least when we accept Hernando's argument that Raymond wrote De seta Machometi and that he did so before 1258. To evaluate Marc's argument on this point, a comparison between the ScG I, c. 6, the De seta Machometi and the Capistrum Iudaearum I, ratio 7 is necessary.


31 The text of Pinsart's letter reads as follows: "[...] Albertus Magnus, inter discipulos ejus D. Thomas, et sodalis hujus Raymundus Martini Barcinonensis." Carpzov (ed.), Introductio, 112.

3. Thomas's theory on dialogue

At the outset of the Summa contra Gentiles, Thomas formulates some epistemic and apologetic rules. He does so after his definition of the officium sapientis, the 'task of the wise man', in the first chapter. According to Thomas, this task is twofold. On the one hand, a wise man should pursue the truth by reflecting on it and expounding it. On the other hand, he should refute errors and false claims against the truth. This second operation is not easy, Thomas notes in the second chapter. Firstly, because the formulations of the various erring infidels (dicta sacrilega singolorum errantium) are not known well enough to us to put forward the reasons needed to refute them. Secondly, because with some groups we do not agree on which Scriptures are authoritative: with the Jews we can dispute on the basis of the Old Testament, with the heretics on the New Testament, but in discussion with Muslims and pagans we must necessarily fall back on natural reason, and the problem is that natural reason is deficient in divine matters.

Then, in the third chapter, Thomas explores the mode of considering the divine truth, which is of a twofold nature, according to him. There are truths about God which exceed natural reason and there are truths about God to which natural reason can reach. The problem is that human knowledge always starts a sensu, at least according to our present state of life, and knowledge of the sensible things cannot lead us to the knowledge of God's substance, of quid est Deus: the effects can never equal the power of their cause. Still, our intellect can be led from cognition a sensu to a certain knowledge in divinis, like the recognition of God's existence, his simplicity or other things which we ought to attribute to the first

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34 ScG I, c. 1.
35 Ibid., c. 2.
36 This double mode of knowledge on divine matters determines the meta-structure of the Summa contra Gentiles. Thomas is occupied with the second mode in the books I to III of the ScG, with the first in book IV.
principle. Such things the philosophers have yet proved demonstratively about God, led by the light of their natural reason.\textsuperscript{37}

Now, the Trinity is a divine truth which exceeds our human intellect. That is because it appertains to God as He is. Scripture leads us to avow it, but we will never understand it in rational terms.\textsuperscript{38} The same holds in fact for God's simplicity. The fact that God is One, we can know by rational investigation. But although we can grasp something of the way in which God must be One, e.g. by understanding our concepts of unity in an analogous way, we shall never understand this unity fully. God transcends all forms of unity we know from the created world.

These epistemic basics are transferred to an apologetic framework in chapter nine. The intention of a wise man should be directed to expounding the double truth of divine things and to destroying the errors against the truth. The divine truths which human reason is able to understand, can be manifested through \textit{rationes demonstrativae} and can convince adversaries. But we must never pretend that such \textit{rationes} also prove the truths of the second category, those which exceed human reason. They can only solve the errors against these truths. Therefore we have to be careful with them. When we adduce them as proofs for the truths which exceed human reason, adversaries will even be confirmed in their errors, while they will get the impression that we have built our faith on weak arguments. The divine truths exceeding human understanding can only be proved by an appeal to Holy Scripture or to miracles which confirm the divine authority of Scripture. Nevertheless, \textit{rationes verisimiles} should be adduced to expound (\textit{manifestare})

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., c. 3: “Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis. [...] Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster in divinam cognitionem ut cognoscat de Deo quia est, et alia huiusmodi quae oportet attribui primo principio.”

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.: “Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Id. IV, c. 1: Ut primo scilicet ea tractentur quae de ipso Deo supra rationem credenda proponuntur, sicut est confession Trinitatis.” See for example also \textit{STh} I, q. 32, a. 1 co.
these truths. Not to convince the adversaries, but to exercise and strengthen the believers.\textsuperscript{39}

Thus, for Thomas there are two cases in which rational arguments have demonstrative power in relation to divine truths. Firstly, in the demonstration of the truths to which the human intellect can reach. And secondly, in the refutation of the claims against truths which exceed our natural intellect. These claims turn out to be only probable or sophistic.\textsuperscript{40} For Thomas it is clear that when the Christian faith is true, the claims against it must be false. He does not accept a double truth.

So, proper reasons against the objections of adversaries negate the necessity which the adversaries claim they have. Although Thomas does not state so explicitly, the implication of his words seems to me that \textit{rationes} produce a reasonable possibility of Christian faith. After all, if accusations of the impossible, absurd or irrational nature of Christian doctrine are neutralized, the doctrine itself becomes maybe not more probable, but nevertheless comes to stand on a possible ground. However, one must never fall in the trap of thinking that, after having disarmed the adversary with the weapon of natural reason, the same weapon suffices to convince him of the truth of Christianity. The certainty of this truth is only grounded on Scripture.

4. Trinity in Raymond Martin

Raymond composed two trinitarian treatises, a first and early one in the \textit{Explanatio Symboli Apostolorum} (1257)\textsuperscript{41} and a second and late one in the \textit{Pugio Fidei} (1278).\textsuperscript{42} In order to understand the differences between these treatises, it is important to be aware of the different aims with which the \textit{Explanatio} and the \textit{Pugio} were written. The \textit{Explanatio} was meant for Christians who lived amid Muslims or who were confronted with Muslim objections against Christian faith.

\textsuperscript{39} ScG I, c. 9.
\textsuperscript{40} ScG I, c. 7: \textit{"... quaecumque argumenta contra fidei documenta ponantur, haec ex principiis naturae inditis per se notis non recte procedere. Unde nec demonstrationis vim habent, sed vel sunt rationes probabiles vel sophisticae."}
\textsuperscript{41} Ed. J. March y Batles, 458-463.
\textsuperscript{42} Edition Carpzov (1687), part III-I, c. 1-11, 479-548.
The *Pugio* was above all written for friars who were to preach and to missionize among Jews. Although these different aims result in important differences in structure, content and emphasis, both trinitarian treatises are part of a coherent apologetic method. In the *Pugio* biblical *auctoritates* dominate the argument. More precisely, only authorities from the Hebrew Bible, since Raymond is very well aware of the fact that neither the Septuagint nor the Vulgate or any Latin translation, has authority for Jews. In the trinitarian treatise of the *Explanatio* the exposition of each article starts with the presentation of *auctoritates*, since in a demonstration of faith scriptural *auctoritates* outweigh *rationes* or *similitudines*. But, since the *Explanatio* was meant to strengthen especially those Christians, who had to cope with Muslim claims against their faith, and since Muslims did not take the authority of Christian Scriptures for granted, it is not surprising that Raymond, when he treats the most controversial doctrines of Christianity, the Trinity and the Incarnation, spends a lot of time on the *rationes*. So, dependent on the identity of the adversary, Raymond highlights either *auctoritates* or *rationes*, without corrupting the fundamental hierarchy which exists between these two different kinds of argument.

4.1. *Trinity in the Explanatio Symboli Apostolorum (1257)*

The exposition of the Trinity in the *Explanatio Symboli Apostolorum* links up with Thomas's epistemic and apologetic conception, which was described in the previous section. Raymond notes, as Thomas does, that it is very difficult to speak on the Trinity, since God is incomparably greater than every created intellect. No one, not even angels, can capture Him as He is. And although Holy Scripture revealed through prophets, apostles and the New Testament that God

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43 “Ostensa igitur unitate divine essentie, sequitur ut ostendatur in ea etiam trinitas personarum. Et hoc potest ostendi primo per auctoritates; quia probatio per auctoritates in hac materia fortior est et certior fidelibus. Deinde rationibus et similitudinibus quoquo modo.” Ibid.

44 *ESA*, a. 1 intro: “Sciendum est autem in principio, quod loqui de Trinitate difficilimum est, eo quod supra intellectum [est], non solum humanum, verum etiam angelicum; secundum quod prophete et sancti testantur. [...] Cum enim Deus incomparabiliter sit maior omni intellectu creato, nullus intellectus creatus eum capere potest perfecte, sicut est.” March (ed.), 457.
is One in essence and three in persons, a perfect understanding of the Trinity is impossible.\footnote{45} God \textit{sicut est} is unknowable.

Raymond’s order of apologetic demonstration follows from this epistemic view: first \textit{auctoritates}, then \textit{rationes}. Raymond believes that \textit{rationes} and \textit{similitudines} can show the Trinity. Not in the way Scripture does, but nevertheless ‘in a way’, \textit{quoquo modo}. He also describes their function in the discussion with infidels: “Since not all wise men accept the authority of the Holy Scriptures, [but] both believers and unbelievers [might] come to terms over \textit{rationes}, we will bring forward some \textit{rationes} to show the Holy Trinity, after having presented the \textit{auctoritates}.”\footnote{46} The previous section shows that Thomas is more precise in defining the use of \textit{rationes}. They serve to demonstrate the truths which human reason can capture. They can be used to refute the claims against the truths which exceed human reason. Finally, with regard to the understanding of the truths exceeding human reason, they can serve to train and strengthen the believers, but not as proof. This precise definition of the function of \textit{rationes} does not express another position than the one Raymond holds. Raymond’s reproduction of the \textit{rationes} shows, that he is fully aware that they cannot prove the truth about the persons of the Trinity. He would immediately agree with Thomas that reason has no demonstrative power in the realm of faith. In the \textit{Pugio Fidei}, when he deals with the question of an eternal existence of the world, he is very explicit: “The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively.”\footnote{47}

On one point, Raymond seems to disagree with Thomas. It was already brought forward that the \textit{Explanatio} has a refutation of the Muslim claim that Jewish and Christian Scriptures were

\footnote{45} Id.: “Et ideo, cum libri sancti sint a Deo, et Deus in libris suis per prophetas et apostolos et in Evangelio se unum esse in essentia et trinum in personis dicat, magis credendum est sibi de se per libros suos, quam alicui; quamvis perfecte intelligi non possit.” Ibid.

\footnote{46} Id.: “Verum, quia auctoritates sacrorum librorum non omnes recipiunt sapientes tam fideles communiter quam infideles rationibus acquiescunt, rationes aliquas post auctoritates ad ostensionem sancte trinitatis in medium proponemus.” Ibid.

\footnote{47} \textit{PF} I, c. 13: “Articuli autem fidei demonstrative probari non possunt...Novitas ergo mundi per revelationem tantum habetur et non potest demonstrative probari [...] unde mundum incepsi non est demonstrabile sed credibile [...]” Carpzov (ed.), 229, n. 2-3.
falsified. The length of this introductory argument and the consequent use of auctoritates in the following explanation of the articles of faith, might suggest that Raymond was less pessimistic about the use of Scripture in discussion with Muslims than Thomas was. After all, Thomas stated, as we saw, that the Christian-Muslim debate must necessarily recur to natural reason, since Muslims do not accept scriptural auctoritates. We must realize, however, that Raymond was a missionary and Thomas was not. Thomas and Raymond agree on the impossibility to convert people to Christianity by means of reason only. At the most, reason has a supporting function in the demonstration of the mysteries of faith. So, a missionary cannot do without Scripture. That is why Raymond gives the reasons with which the Muslim rejection of the authenticity of the gospels and the Torah can be countered. Part of these reasons form passages from the Koran in which the esteem and authority of Jewish and Christian Scriptures is expressed. The logical next step after this preamble is an explanation in which the use of scriptural authorities is not avoided. This is perfectly in accordance with Thomas, who defined apologetics as both the refutation of errors and the manifestation of the truth. In my opinion, Thomas's remark on the debate between Christians and Muslims expresses only a consequence of the fact that Muslims, in his age, were suspicious of Christian Scripture, while Raymond did the only thing to do for a Christian missionary: invalidate the charge and count on the cogency of his argument.

Though not supplying us with an explicit description of his method, Raymond's rationes show his epistemic principles perfectly. For example, when we read the first and the fourth ratio together. The first ratio is based on two premises, which were widely accepted in scholastic thought. The first premise is that all caused things demonstrate their cause (omne causatum demonstrat suam causam), like iron heated by fire shows the heat of the fire. The second premise is that in creation we find a common threefold structure. Raymond quotes Aristotle here, who holds that the number three is the number of all things and figurat the trinity of things. The

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48 ESA, 452-455 (ed. March).
conclusion of the syllogism is that the highest Cause of creation must be threefold in a way. Having concluded that, Raymond sets a third premise to work, which corrects the conclusion of the first and second in a radical way. This third premise is that God exceeds our understanding. So, while according to the first and second premise God must be trinitarian in a way *(quoquo modo)*, this Trinity transcends our understanding at the same time. Our knowledge and images of it, being the knowledge and images of creatures, will finally collapse before the fact that we cannot know God as He is *(sicut est)*. We can attribute certain properties to God, but there exists a fundamental difference between how these properties are related to created things and to God. Raymond claims that they are in us, but that we cannot be identified with them; ‘in’ God however they are not, because what is ‘in’ God is God; there is nothing ‘in’ God which is not God. In other words, we must not pretend that we can locate or describe the properties ‘in’ God, because they are not ‘in’ God, they are God.50

In the fourth *ratio* Raymond returns to the question of divine properties. He claims that even the philosophers have acknowledged that God has *potentia, sapientia* and *voluntas/bonitas*.51 Nevertheless, their knowledge did not extend to the ‘personal properties’, which belong to the divine persons. The philosophers’ knowledge extended only to things common to the three persons. Indeed, each of the persons is *sapiens, potens et volens*, and the *potentia*, the *sapientia* and the *voluntas* (or *bonitas*) of the three persons are one, since God is One. But, at the same time, the *potentia* is proper to the Father, the *sapientia* to the Son and the *voluntas* (or *bonitas*) to the Holy Spirit.52 The knowledge of the

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50 Id.: “[…] quia proprietates cuiuslibet rei insunt ipsi rei et non sunt ipsa res. In Deo autem non sunt. Imo, omnes proprietates, que in Deo sunt, Deus sunt; quia nichil est in Deo, quod non sit Deus.” Ibid.


52 Id.: “Attamen eorum noticia non fuit secundum proprietates personales, que sunt in ipsis personis distincte, sed secundum ea, que ipsis personis appropriantur, que sunt communia cuilibet persone. Nam quelibet trium personarum est sapiens, potens, et volens, et ipsarum trium personarum una
philosophers ends at the avowal of God’s simplicity. Their knowledge lacks the precision of the Christian faith. The only way to arrive at the notion of divine personal properties and persons is to accept the Law, the Prophets and the New Testament. Here Raymond shows the distinction between reason and faith. On its own efforts, reason can come to the confession of God’s simplicity, to the definition of divine properties and to the conclusion that all these properties ‘in’ God are one. But only in faith it can be known that God is a Trinity of persons and that each of the three main properties should be attributed to one of the persons.

Raymond then proceeds with an analogy of the rational soul, showing the congruity between reason and faith: First a man has the power to know, then he gets to know and then he wants and loves what he got to know. By elevating this order of knowing to God, he will get a certain understanding of the Trinity. The potentia of the Father is the principle of the other two properties. The Son is generated by the Father, as wisdom is generated by the power to know. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as the will to know and love stem from both power and wisdom. According

It would be wrong to translate potentia here as ‘potency’. It must be translated as ‘power’ or ‘principle’. The notion of potency cannot be attributed to God. The use of these three attributes is of course not an invention of Raymond. Abelard (1079-1142) and Hugh of Saint Victor (1096-1142) used it already. Thomas did this as well and he ascribes its source to Augustine (STh I, q. 39, a. 8), which was later attributed to Hugh of Saint Victor. Cf. D. Lasker, Jewis philosophical Polemics against Christianity in the Middle Ages, New York, 1977, 63-64 and the notes on 203-204.
to Raymond, this knowledge of the Trinity, as believed by the patriarchs, prophets, apostles and Christians today, is a higher mode of understanding than the philosophical knowledge of God's simplicity and the trinitarian structure of creation. Although the premise that all caused things demonstrate their cause, may lead philosophers to an attribution of the created trinity to the divine, this operation does not exceed the realm of the rational confession that God is One. God as a Trinity of persons, however, exceeds human rationality and is part of revelation only. An appropriation of the three main divine properties to the divine persons is a reasonable operation, but it is only possible within the realm of trinitarian faith.

To summarize, the essentials of Raymond's presentation of the Trinity in the *Explanatio* reflect an epistemology and apologetic method that are very similar to those Thomas propagates in the *Summa contra Gentiles*. Firstly, both lay great emphasis on God's transcendence and the impossibility to know Him as He is. Secondly, both distinguish clearly between faith and reason within the epistemic order regarding the divine. Thirdly, both employ a similar hierarchy of *auctoritates* and *rationes* in the field of apologetics. Fourthly, the apparently different view on the use of Scripture in the discussion with Muslims, proves to be not a disagreement between the two friars, but Raymond's application in the 1250's of a set of apologetic rules, which Thomas defined a few years later.

4.2. *The 'Pugio Fidei' (1278)*

When Thomas complains about the difficulty to combat the various errors of the adversaries of Christian faith, he has two reasons in mind. One is that, unlike Jews and heretics, Muslims and pagans do not accept the authority of Scripture. This, as we have remarked already, leads Thomas to conclude that a discussion with Muslims cannot be executed on the basis of biblical *auctoritates*, but only through the use of *rationes*.\(^{55}\) As to the Jews, Raymond nuances Thomas's statement by stressing, that they neither accept the Christian canon of the Old Testament, nor its translation. Only Hebrew Scripture has authority for them and must therefore be the

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\(^{55}\) *ScG* I, c. 2.
prime source for the mission among Jews. This conviction makes the *Pugio* in the first place an exegetical work.\(^{56}\)

Thomas formulates another reason for being pessimistic about a ‘dialogue’ with non-Christians: “because the sacrilegious remarks of individual men who have erred are not so well known to us that we may use what they say as the basis of proceeding to a refutation of their errors.”\(^{57}\) Thomas is envious of the old doctors who knew how to deal with the gentiles, because they were gentiles themselves or at least well versed in their doctrines.\(^{58}\) Here again Raymond makes a step forward in comparison to Thomas. He plunges in rabbinic tradition, especially in rabbinic exegesis, and by becoming an expert in Hebrew and rabbinics he tries to overcome the problem Thomas observes. Raymond learns where to find his *rationes* against the Jews. He finds them both in Hebrew Scripture and in rabbinics. Moreover, he discovers that Jewish tradition is not a tradition of only *dicta sacrilega*, only something to refute. He finds many *dicta* which in his eyes are confirmations of Christian faith and

\(^{56}\) I will quote the *Pugio* from ms. 1,405 of the St. Geneviève Library in Paris. (The interpunction in the quotes is mine.) I will also give the references to the Carpzov edition, i.e. numbers of pages and sections. (In the edition the chapters are divided in numbered sections; in the ms. Geneviève there are marked sections, but less than in the edition and never numbered.) As I mentioned in note 18, the Leipzig edition of Carpzov (1687) is a reprint of De Voisin’s edition (1651). There is a problem with the use of the Carpzov/De Voisin edition. It is based on four manuscripts of which three are lost. The oldest manuscript we nowadays possess, ms. 1,405 of the St. Geneviève Library in Paris (13th century), was unknown to De Voisin. At the moment 11 manuscripts of the *Pugio Fidei* are extant, of which besides the ms. Geneviève the oldest are those of Sevilla and Salamanca (both 14th century). Some manuscripts only contain the so-called *Pugio parvus*, i.e. part I and II (four manuscripts, e.g. Sevilla); these lack the original Hebrew (or Aramaic) quotations and have only their Latin translations. Some of the manuscripts of the complete *Pugio* have both the Hebrew/Aramaic quotations and their Latin translations (e.g. Geneviève and Salamanca), others only the Latin. I am grateful to Görge Hasselhoff for inviting me to Bonn and putting his microfilm of the Geneviève manuscript at my disposal.\(^{57}\)


\(^{58}\) Ibid.
he believes that these offer opportunities to defeat the Jews with their own weapons.\(^{59}\)

Raymond proceeds along three lines in the *Pugio*. Firstly, the refutation of what in his eyes are *dicta sacrilega*: Jewish claims against Christianity, false Jewish doctrines and wrong exegetical conclusions. He takes much trouble to show that these claims and ideas derive from a erroneous reading of Hebrew Scripture and a bad use of natural reason. Secondly, examples of Jewish exegesis and doctrines that according to him confirm the Christian faith. Thirdly, his own exegesis of Hebrew Scripture. Throughout the parts II and III, which are primarily written against the Jews, these lines are closely intertwined. The first and third line reflect the double task of the wise man: manifestation of the truth, refutation of the errors. The second line is a direct result of the study of Jewish beliefs and exegesis. It serves in fact both the first and the third line, the two sides of the double task, since examples of Jewish exegesis and doctrines that confirm the Christian faith help to manifest the truth and, at the same, are an indirect refutation of Jewish rejections of it.\(^{60}\)

The trinitarian treatise in the *Pugio* has roughly the following structure. First Raymond treats God’s simplicity (chapters 1 and 2). Secondly, he explains the Trinity in relation to the divine properties (chapters 3-5). Thirdly, he shows that in Proverbs 8:22-30 Scripture speaks about the divine generation of the property Wisdom and not about the generation of a first creature (chapters 6-7). Fourthly, he proves that God ‘has’ a divine Son and therefore must be called Father and that this Son and the property Wisdom are

\(^{59}\) *PF*, Prooemium: “Non respuamus ergo traditiones eiusmodi, sed potius amplectamur […] quod nihil ad confutandum iudeorum impudentiam tam validum reperitur, nihil ad eorum convicendam nequitiam tam efficax invenitur.” Carpzov (ed.), 3, n. 9.

\(^{60}\) The use of rabbinic tradition as a central element in the refutation of Jewish claims against Christian doctrine is behind the title *pugio* (sword, dagger). Raymond compares his operation to that of Judith, who took the risk to enter the camp of the enemy, managed to take away Holofernes’s sword when he was asleep and cut off his head (see Judit 13). *PF*, Prooemium: “Denique quid iucundius christiano quam si. distorquere facillime possit de manibus hostium gladium et exemplo mucrone proprio caput infidele praeicidere, aut instar Judith ipsius arrepto pugione truncare.” Carpzov (ed.), 3-4, n. 9.
identical, and further that the Messiah is this divine Son or Wisdom (chapters 8-10). Fifthly, he discusses the procession and the mission the Holy Spirit, demonstrating that the Holy Spirit is the divine property of caritas, bonitas or voluntas (chapter 11).

From an apologetic perspective the treatise has a twofold structure, which I would typify as ratiocinatio, a rational reflection on scriptural facts (chapters 1-5), versus exegesis of scriptural facts (chapters 6-10).61 The title of chapter six, which is in the ms. Geneviève, expresses this caesura: "Another mode of persuading and of speaking on the Trinity."62

In the first part of the trinitarian treatise Raymond points out that Judaism and Christianity share the same foundation regarding the doctrine on God. He tries here to demonstrate that although

61 Gilbert Dahan has made me aware of the various strands of the term ratio in medieval anti-Jewish polemic. Dahan discerns three manners in which the term is employed. "(1) ratio passive: raison-référence abstraite, qui est synonyme de vérité; (2) ratio dynamique, ratiocinatio: l'effort réflexif autonome, dégagé du donné révélé et opposé donc à l'autorité; (3) rationes: synonyme d'arguments." Cf. G. Dahan, L'usage de la ratio dans la polémique contre les juifs, in H. Santiago-Otero (ed.), Diálogo filosófico-religioso entre cristianismo, judaísmo y islamismo durante la edad media, Brepols 1994, 289-308. Unlike Dahan, I would not oppose the faculty of ratiocinatio to the use’ of scriptural auctoritates. Chapter five of the trinitarian treatise is a good example of how the faculty of ratiocinatio is employed in combination with the scriptural facts given in chapter 1-4. In chapter 6-10 the emphasis is more on the auctoritates and their exegesis. I do not maintain that the border between ratiocinatio within the boundaries of Scripture versus exegesis of Scripture is always very sharp, for exegesis of course always has an element of reasoning. Thus, I do not agree with Dahan's conclusion on Raymond Martin: "Raymond Martin connaît bien la philosophie (Aristote et ses sequaces musulmans): mais dès qu'il s'adresse aux juifs, il ne peut que donner une argumentation à base d'auctoritates, laissant de côté la ratio." Dahan (1994), 304. Such a sharp opposition between auctoritas and ratio is in my opinion indefensible, at least with regard to the work of Raymond Martin.

62 PF III-I, c. 6: "ubi est alius modus persuadendi et loquendi de trinitate." Carpzov (ed.), 507. Another sign that Raymond is about to make a new move, is given at the end of chapter 5: PF III-I, c. 5: "Si cui vero modus quem ego sive disputando sive persuandendo iudaes et sarracenis mysterium trinitatis semper tenui magis placuerit, legat sequens capitulum." Carpzov (ed.), 506, n. 5.
Hebrew Scripture expresses the simplicity of the One God very clearly, it contains also many examples of speaking about God in the plural. This has lead Judaism to their doctrine of the divine *middot* (properties) and it has confirmed Christianity in their doctrine of the Trinity. Confronting both doctrines, Raymond tries to show that on a fundamental level they do not differ. According to him the problem is that the Jewish solution is not precise enough. When the scriptural *auctoritates* regarding plurality and divine properties are reread and reconsidered, the conclusion must be that Christianity is certainly not illogical with its confession of a divine Trinity. As I noted above, this first step in Raymond’s defence of the Trinity has, within the boundaries of Scripture, to a high degree the character of *ratiocinatio*, of an appeal to common sense. It gives the impression that it is a scriptural continuation of the argument we met in the *Explanatio*, where Raymond claims that creation has a fundamental trinitarian structure and that its Cause therefore must also be trinitarian *quoquo modo*. It simply states that where Hebrew Scripture uses the plural when speaking of God, these expressions have mostly a fundamental trinitarian structure. The character of the second step (chapters 6-10) is different. Here the proof of the Trinity becomes thoroughly biblical. Raymond here shows himself as an exegete of Hebrew Scripture.

The ‘ratio’ of the Trinity

The fifth chapter has a key function within the trinitarian treatise of the *Pugio*. Here Christian and Jewish doctrine are opposed, while at the same time a common ground is posed. Of special interest is Raymond’s solution to bridge the gap between the two doctrines: his use of the doctrine of divine *middot*/properties at the service of an explanation of the Trinity that neither is to rouse the fury of the Jews, nor disregard the trinitarian doctrine. I have another reason for concentrating myself in the remaining part of this paper on chapter five. To defend the legitimacy of his suggestion that the term ‘properties’ is a sound alternative for the term ‘persons’ – the latter

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63 I would say that chapter 11, a short treatise on the Holy Spirit, is a reiteration of the procedure in the chapters 6-10. Raymond here shows the scriptural grounds for, on the one hand, the doctrine of the procession the Holy Spirit and its identification with the property of Love (*amor, caritas*), on the other hand, the mission of the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of the Messiah.
according to him being detested by the Jews in divine matters – Raymond appeals to three authorities: Augustine, Thomas and Bernard. Raymond quotes Thomas twice in this chapter, once mentioning his name, the other time not (as with all the quotations from the *Summa* in part I of the *Pugio*). Both quotations, surprisingly, are not taken from the *Summa contra Gentiles*, but from Thomas’s commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. I will return to these quotations later.

The word *middah*, property, is introduced at the end of chapter four. Raymond calls the Jews ‘enemies of God’, because they deny ‘his middot’. He throws them a Talmud passage in the face, in which is said that God loves three kinds of people: the ones who do not get angry, the ones who do not get drunk and the ones who do not rise against his middot. This passage has clearly an introductory function for the argument in the next chapter. It is meant to parry in advance a possible Jewish denial that the doctrine of the middot is an essential of Judaism. Chapter five then sets off with the objective for what follows in the rest of the trinitarian treatise. Raymond says he wants to demonstrate that the three divine persons are one God and that already in Hebrew Scripture they had the names Father, Son and Holy Spirit. After having noted that in Hebrew the word *middah* means primarily ‘measure’ (*mensura*) and that it has derived meanings, such as ‘mode’ (*modus, mos*), ‘habit’ (*consuetudo*), ‘property’ or ‘quality’ (*proprietas seu qualitas*), Raymond argues that in the meaning of property or quality the Jews use the term *middah* also in divine matters. He states that with respect to God the Jews use the word *middah* in a broader sense than Christians the word *proprietas*. He then defines the Christian theological use of *proprietas*.

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64 *PF* III-I, c. 4: “Denique a contrario sensu inimicos dei esse iudeos quia eius middoth, id est personis vel proprietatibus, contradicunt, inde habetur in libro *pesah seni* in *pereq aarbe pesahim* taliter scriptum est: Tres sunt quos diligit deus, illum videlicet qui non irascitur et illum qui non inebritatur et illum qui non stat contra proprietates eius.” Carpzov (ed.), 495, n. 12.

65 Id., c. 5: “De patris igitur ac filii et spiritus sancti confusus auxilio in hoc quinto capitulo nec non et in sequentibus tres has personas unum esse deum atque his nominibus olim in scipturis hebraicis nominatas fuisse ipsa divina scriptura teste monstrabo.” Carpzov (ed.), 501, n. 1.
Raymond starts with the generally accepted position of Augustin, discerning five divine properties: *paternitas, innascibilitas, filiatio, processio* and *communis spiratio*. Subsequently he tells us that these five can be called 'notions' because they denote the persons, or 'distinctions' because they distinguish the persons, or 'relations' because the persons always relate to each other, or 'properties' because they belong to the persons appropriately. After that Thomas is adduced. The quotation is taken from the corpus of *In I Sent.*, d. 26 q. 2. a. 3, where Thomas subdivides the five properties mentioned above. Three are called 'personal properties' (*paternitas, filiatio* and *processio*), because they 'constitute' the persons. The other two (*innascibilitas, communis spiratio*) are indeed 'notions' of a person, but are not 'personal'. Of these five notions *paternitas* and *innascibilitas* belong only to the Father, *filiatio* to the Son, *processio* to the Holy Spirit. *Communis spiratio* is strictly speaking not a property, because it belongs to two persons, i.e. the Father and the Son, but it is a property in the sense that it is said to be the *proprium* of two persons together: the Father and the Son who beget the Holy Spirit. Further, of these five only four are 'relations', i.e. *paternitas, filiatio, processio* and *communis spiratio*. *Innascibilitas* is strictly speaking only a relation insofar it is reduced to the genus of 'affirmation', like 'not a human being' affirms the existence of the genus 'human being'. "To put it briefly", Raymond concludes, "the

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66 Ibid.: "Quinque etenim dicuntur apud nos secundum beatum augustinum de deo: paternitas, innascibilitas, filiatio, processio et communis spiratio."
67 Ibid.: "Dicuntur autem ista quinque notiones quia notificant personas, aliquando vero distinctiones eo quod personas distinguunt, aliquando relationes, quia per ipsas quandoque personae ad se invicem referuntur. Dicuntur etiam proprietates quia personis proprie insunt."
68 Raymond has reordered Thomas' text. I will only quote Raymond's text. *PF* III-I, c. 5, n. 1: "Istarum autem tres dicuntur personales proprietates, paternitas nempe, filiatio et processio, eo quod personas faciunt vel constituunt. Reliquae duae sunt notiones personae sed non personales. Praedictarum autem quinque notionum, paternitas et innascibilitas conveniunt solummodo patri, filiatio tantummodo filio, spiritui vero sancto processio. Communis autem spiratio non est dicenda proprietas simpliciter quia duabus convenit personis, id est patri et filio, sed secundum quid, scilicet secundum quod aliquid dicit esse proprium ad aliquid. Est enim proprium patris et filii respectu spiritus sancti. Harum quoque quinque proprietatum quatuor sunt relationes tantum, scilicet paternitas, filiatio,
[personal] properties and the persons are according to the judgment of our maiores one and the same thing. They differ only in ratio. Property and person differ like the abstract and concrete in one and the same genus." This again seems to be inspired by Thomas, even though it is hard to prove that Raymond quotes Thomas here.\(^6^9\) The conclusion finally is warranted by Bernard, of whom Raymond inserts the following thundering words: "The Catholic faith confesses that the properties of the persons are nothing else than the persons and they are nothing else than the One God, the one divine substance, the one divine essence."\(^7^0\)

The identification of 'personal property' and 'person' enables Raymond to avoid the use of the term 'person'. He wants to avoid it, because "Jews very much detest to hear the notion 'persons' applied to God", as he states at the end of the chapter.\(^7^1\) With the term 'personal property', he might find acceptance with a Jewish audience, pointing out to them that Father, Son and Holy Spirit must be seen as middot. The next challenge is to prove that these three personal middot are indeed designated in Scripture, which is an exegetical operation Raymond undertakes from chapter six on. But before he makes the shift to biblical auctoritates, he follows in the rest of chapter five the line of ratiocinatio: he shows that the several middot expressed in Jewish tradition are to be subsumed under the
three main middot which are identified in Christianity, i.e. potencia, sapientia and bonitas/voluntas, and that these three (and their equivalents) on biblical and logical grounds must be attributed respectively to the Father, the Son and the Spirit.

Raymond presents some rabbinic opinions on the number of the divine middot. Firstly he adduces the locus classicus in which the Jewish doctrine on the middot is rooted, i.e. Exodus 34:6-7. He shows how the rabbis discern here thirteen middot, with some variation in defining them.\textsuperscript{72} Subsequently the Midrash on Psalms (93:5), the commentary of rabbi Moses ha-Darshan on Genesis (1:2) and the Babylonian Talmud (Hagiga 12a) are brought forward in order to show the tradition of ten divine middot. Although Raymond does not name the authorities to prove it, he claims that there are Jews who attribute twenty-three middot to God and that the Jews are able to find in Scripture innumerable other, similar middot.\textsuperscript{73} For such a poorly organized proliferation, he typifies the Jews as “blind men caressing the wall of truth”, paraphrasing a word of Isaiah (59:10). According to Raymond, the Jews accuse Christians of “crushing divine Unity”, but they themselves proclaim a multitude of middot, while Christians only stick to three and subsume all the others mentioned in Scripture under these.\textsuperscript{74}

So the Jewish accusation that the Trinity is illogical and absurd, is reversed by Raymond. In the Explanatio, he admits that a rational understanding of the Trinity is impossible, but that we find a triple structure in creation and that on logical grounds we are allowed to transpose this structure to God as the Cause of creation, provided that we acknowledge the transcendence of this Trinity and the strict simplicity of God. In the trinitarian treatise of the Pugio,

\textsuperscript{72} T.B. Rosh ha-Shana 17b is quoted.
\textsuperscript{73} PF III-I, c. 5: “Que namque maior coecitas potest esse, aut que vecordia maior, quam eorum qui XXti tres istas middoth attribuunt deo, atque a simili innumerarum aliar quae possunt inveniri istis similis in scripturis [...]” Carpzov (ed.), 504, n. 4.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid: “Ecce ex istic satis, ut puto, liqet, quod iudei palpant ut ceci veritatis parietem, ut dicit ysaias in persona ipsorum [cap. 59:10] [...] Nos vero qui non nisi tres personas, vel personales proprietates, vel tres middoth ut ipsi loquantur, credimus esse deum, unamque essentiam, dissecatores ac ruptores divine vocant ac reputant unitatis, qui omne quod ipsi deo vel confuse dicunt, vel intelligent, vel ad unitatem essentiec [...] vel ad solam istam quae dicta est, quam ipsi ‘sillus’ vocant, reducimus trinitatem?” Ibid.
Raymond sticks to posing divine simplicity as a safeguard for God’s transcendence, in relation to which the doctrine of the Trinity always keeps its basic character of unknowability and does not degenerate into a rational explanation of God. But, at the same time, he observes that Hebrew Scripture tends to speak in triples with respect to God. Then, in chapter 5, he pushes us to trim the scriptural bush of divine middot to three main branches. He quotes the commentary of rabbi Moses ha-Darshan on Genesis (1:2), reading: “R.Sutra, son of Tobia, said that Rav said: ‘In ten properties of God the world was created and they are the following: sapientia, prudentia, scientia, fortitudo, robur, increpatio, justitia, judicium, pietas et miseratones (or misericordiae)’.75 But, after that, he says: “We restrict them very rightly to a trinity of attributes, i.e. potentia, sapientia and bonitas (or bona voluntas).”76 Robur, justitia, judicium and increpatio belong to potentia. Sapientia, prudentia and scientia (or notitia) are synonymous. Pietas, misericordia (or miseratones) belong to bonitas. These three, i.e. potentia, sapientia and bonitas are not ‘persons’ or ‘personal properties’. They are three appropriata to the persons, getting their specific significance when coupled to the persons. The Father is the potentia, that generates the sapientia nata or genita,77 which is the Son. Amor, dilectio, caritas, bonitas or bona voluntas are the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son together.78 The analogy of potentia, sapientia and bonitas,
which Raymond used before in the *Explanatio*, is here presented as a fully logical outcome of the scriptural facts regarding the divine *middot*. For Raymond this outcome has a higher rational quality than the way the rabbis express the doctrine. Moreover, Raymond tries to play the rabbis off against one another. Pointing to their discord is an important part of his refutation. On this point again, his view is in accordance with Thomas, who said: "For, as the Philosopher says, even falsehoods give witness, for falsehoods stand apart not only from the truth but from one another."

But Raymond realizes that if he wants to convince the Jews, he needs to make his argument more cogent. The reduction to three capital *middot* (*potentia, sapientia, bonitas*) and their attribution to the three personal *middot* (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) is a nice demonstration of *ratiocinari*, but it needs of course a stronger scriptural foundation. The analysis of this new step in Raymond’s defence of the Trinity I leave for another occasion.

5. Conclusions

This paper has shown that a comparison of Raymond Martin’s work with that of Thomas Aquinas promises to be productive. It has summarized the apologetic method Thomas develops in the opening chapters of the *Summa contra Gentiles* and investigated whether this method is reflected in the two trinitarian treatises Raymond wrote, an early one in the *Explanatio Symboli Apostolorum* (1257) and a late one in the *Pugio Fidei* (1278). The conclusion is that in both works Raymond puts into practice the set of rules Thomas formulates in the *summa* and that Raymond’s work forms an excellent illustration of how these rules were applied in a Dominican mission context. This does not necessarily mean that it was Thomas who inspired Raymond on this point. In Raymond’s *Explanatio*, the method is already at work, and it was written before the *summa*. The fact that Raymond was closely connected to the Dominican *studia linguarum* suggests that these rules were part of a broader Dominican thinking on apologetics and mission, and that Thomas reproduced them in the

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79 *ScG* IV, c. 7: "[…] nam vero, ut Philosophus dicit, etiam falsa testantur; falsa vero non solum a veris, sed etiam ab invicem distant."
Summa contra Gentiles, since this work has an explicit apologetic character. With regard to the question what Thomas pushed to write the summa, in the introduction of this paper the two main, opposite views in the scholarly debate of the past decades were rendered briefly. In the following section, the question was transposed to the question on the early reception of it. Raymond Martin proves to be a very early recipient of the summa in his Pugio Fidei. In fact, Raymond’s entire vocation is a radical application of Thomas’s insight that to be effective in refuting the errors of a certain group, one ought to be conversant with its mentality and tradition. After the examination of Raymond’s life and some of the manuals he wrote on behalf of the missions among the Muslims and the Jews, it becomes very unlikely that the Summa contra Gentiles too served as such a manual. Unlike Raymond, Thomas was neither versed in the languages, nor in the religious traditions of these groups. In comparison with the arguments Raymond elaborated for his fellow missionaries, it is hardly conceivable that Thomas meant his arguments in the summa to be used directly in a discussion with Muslims or Jews. Nevertheless, the summa may have been used in the Dominican studia linguarum as a manual for learning Christian doctrine, for getting an idea of all kinds of claims against it and becoming conscious of the possible strategies to be employed in confrontation with the infideles. After all, was Thomas not the one, who explicitly warned against the dangers of disputing with infideles and who held that a Christian participant ought to be “wise and firm in his belief”?\textsuperscript{80}

Exercising his two trinitarian treatises, we have further seen that Raymond elaborates them in a rather different way. This paper holds that the primary cause of these differences is not the time span of fifteen years between them, but their different aims. The Explanatio is an exposition of doctrine which was meant for Christians defending their faith against Muslims, the Pugio a doctrinal manual for friars who were to preach and missionize among Jews. In both works, Raymond sticks to the standard hierarchy in the demonstration of Christian truths which transcend the rational understanding (to which the Trinity also belongs), i.e. auctoritates-rationes (including similitudines). But, within this

\textsuperscript{80} Cf. STh II-II, q. 10, a. 7: “Et quidem coram sapientibus in fide firmis nullum periculum est disputare de fide.”
scheme, the trinitarian treatise of the *Explanatio*, being related to the discussion with Muslims, emphasizes the *rationes*, and that of the *Pugio*, primarily written for the discussion with the Jews, the *auctoritates*. This does not mean that the argument in the *Pugio* lacks all *ratio*. On the contrary, the faculty of *ratiocinari* plays a central role in bridging the gap between the Jewish doctrine on the One God and the Christian on the Triune God. Raymond explains the Trinity in both treatises by means of the notion of the divine properties, which for both Muslims and Jews has authority. The key term is 'personal middot/properties'. Raymond holds that in the debate with Jews and Muslims the Trinity should be defended as a Trinity of divine personal properties, as an alternative for the notion of the Trinity of divine persons, despised among Muslims and Jews. An appeal to authoritative Christian theologians, i.e. Augustine, Bernard and Thomas, serves to ensure that his position is accepted as sound Christian doctrine. In the *Explanatio*, Raymond claims, that reason cannot go further than attributing the three main properties, i.e. *potentia*, *sapientia* and *voluntas/bonitas*, to God's simplicity in which they must be one, while faith inspired by Scripture, reasoning with the scriptural facts, must attribute each of them to one of the divine persons, so that the persons and the personal properties illuminate each others meaning. According to Raymond the three ‘personal middot’, i.e. Father, Son and Holy Spirit, are already designated in Hebrew Scripture (though not in a neat trinitarian formula81) and therefore the doctrine of the Trinity can be proved demonstratively, with scriptural *auctoritates*, to Jews and, in case they are willing to accept the authority of Scripture, to Muslims as well.

Apart from the many parallels between the *Summa contra Gentiles* and the first part of the *Pugio*, which have been part of a scholarly debate for about a century, some new parallels between Raymond's trinitarian treatise in the *Pugio* and Thomas's commentary on the Sentences of Lombard have been presented in this paper. This inevitably raises the question, why verbal echos of the *summa* hardly recur in the second and third part of the *Pugio*. This is all the more surprising, as it seems that the *summa* has a formative function on several levels of the whole *Pugio* (structure, theological and apologetic method, the use of Scripture). This paper

81 *PF* III-I, c. 7: "[...] liqet non sic in una tessera". Carpzov (ed.), 521, n. 1.
has focused on the epistemic and apologetic method both friars employ. A comparison on other levels is part of further research.

For systematic theology such a comparison promises to be interesting, since it shows how the formulations of Christian doctrine shift when a theologian, in this case Raymond Martin, is challenged to consider it from the perspective of his interlocutors, in this case Muslims and Jews. Since theology in our times has an important part to play in the development of a fruitful intercultural and interreligious dialogue, each case-study of the reformulation of doctrine, inspired by apologetic and dialogic motives, may contribute to that task. Even a medieval example in which conversion was so obviously the aim.
WHO IS THE JEW THOMAS AQUINAS REFERS TO AS 'RABBI MOYES' AND WHAT IS HIS RELEVANCE FOR THE NOTION OF GOD?*

Görge K. Hasselhoff

In a way the title of my paper contains a provocation. The title of my paper could, for example, have been: 'Thomas Aquinas and Moses Maimonides on God'. On that subject quite a number of brilliant publications have been written. I just might remind you of the works by Jacob Guttmann, the famous Jewish scholar from the 19th century Jewish-Theological Seminary of Breslau who initiated the Aquinas-Maimonides research.1 Or to mention just two scholars who in the 1980s and 1990s worked on a systematic comparison of the two medieval thinkers, Avital Wohlman from Jerusalem and David Burrell from Notre Dame. Wohlman wrote the two excellent books about Thomas d’Aquin et Maïmonide: un dialogue exemplaire2 and as an antithesis Maïmonide et Thomas d’Aquin: un dialogue impossible3. Burrell even widened the perspective to Islam when writing his excellent books Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina,

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Maimonides, Aquinas⁴ and Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions⁵. Burrell could conclude the first book: "In that respect our inquiry reflects the spirit of the one whose position and writings linked Christians with Arabs: Moses Maimonides."⁶ Nonetheless the title of my paper aims at something different. I am not that much interested in a systematic comparison of the two thinkers mentioned but rather I would like to illuminate one historical dimension of the relation of Thomas Aquinas to Moses Maimonides. This historical dimension relates to the name of the Jewish author.

In the Christian sources of the thirteenth to the sixteenth century Maimonides is called 'Rabbi Moyses' or sometimes 'Rabbi Moyses Egyptius'.⁷ In the latter case it is quite clear that the name refers to Maimonides. In the first case the attribution is not that clear because there were at least three rabbis which I found in Christian literature who are called 'Moyses'. In the chronological order the first was the convert Petrus Alfonsi who as a Jew called himself 'Rabbi Moyses'.⁸ A second 'Rabbi Moyses' I discovered in a manuscript from the Vatican library is one Jew who is mentioned among others in the Extracciones ex Talmud which are normally attributed to Theobaldus de Saxonia.⁹ That particular Rabbi Moyses might be identical with Moshe ha-Darshan, i.e. Moses the Preacher who quite often is mentioned in the Dagger of Faith by Raymond

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⁴ David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God. Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas, Notre Dame 1986.
⁷ In the Eugenio Garin’s edition of Pico della Mirandola’s works his name is written without the title ‘rabbi’, see, e.g., Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem, a cura di Eugenio Garin, Florence 1946/1952, vol. 1/2, 336; vol. I/3, 344, 374.
⁹ See Vatican-City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Ms. Vat. lat., 822, fol. 204rb.
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Martini. The third ‘Rabbi Moyses’ – and that is the ‘Rabbi Moyses’ to whom Thomas Aquinas refers to more than eighty times – is generally equated with the author of the More nevukhim (‘Guide for the Perplexed’) and of Mishneh Torah (‘Repetition of the Torah’), i.e. Moshe ben Maimon (1138-1204).

My question is whether this equation is correct. The answer to this question shall be developed in two steps. First, I will show which Maimonidean writings Thomas Aquinas could have known. Second, I will analyse several passages in Aquinas’ works in which he makes use of the Jew.

1. Which Maimonidean writings could Thomas Aquinas have known?

Moses Maimonides who died on Tebet 20th, 4963 (= December 12th, 1204), wrote on a broad field of subjects. Among his writings are some on medicine, a huge number on halakhah, i.e. the Jewish ritual law, and few writings on philosophical and scientific problems. In Judaism there is a famous proverb to characterise Maimonides: Mi-Moshe we-ad-Moshe qam ke-Moshe (‘From Moses to Moses nobody raised like Moses’). With this proverb it shall be shown that Maimonides was a scholar who combined many different aspects of knowledge. Which of these many different writings then were translated into Latin?

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13 In the aftermath of the 800th anniversary of his death a number of books and volumes dedicated to his memory were published, see, e.g., G.K. Hasselhoff and Otfried Fraisse (eds.), Moses Maimonides (1138-1204) – His Religious, Scientific, and Philosophical Wirkungsgeschichte in Different
His writings on medicine which made him one of the most important Jewish doctors were translated after Thomas Aquinas' death.\(^{14}\) His writings on halakhah were with one or two exceptions translated only after the Reformation took place.\(^{15}\) The only writings translated in Aquinas' lifetime were parts of the *Guide for the Perplexed*.

Before I go into details I have to mention one problem concerning the languages in which Maimonides wrote. Maimonides' mother tongue was Arabic, or to be more precise the Jewish dialect of the Mediterranean world called Judaeo-Arabic. In that language he wrote his medical, philosophical, and scientific works.\(^{16}\) In addition some of his halakhic writings were also written in Arabic. The main part of the halakhic writings was written in Hebrew, the language of the rabbis which throughout the 12th century again became a popular language among the Jews world-wide. In the last years of Maimonides' life the *Guide for the Perplexed* became translated into Hebrew by Shmuel ibn Tibbon, entitled *More ha-Nevukhim*, the proper name until today.\(^{17}\) This translation was quite difficult to read because Ibn Tibbon used many Arabic words as termini technici. Nonetheless his translation was quite accurate. About ten years later a second translation of the *Guide* was written...
by Yehuda al-Harizi. This translation was less accurate (and in some instances even wrong), but it was much easier to read.

Throughout the 1230s or at the beginning of the 1240s some anonymous translators, or perhaps only one anonymous translator, provided a translation of the preface and the first chapter of the second of the three books of the *More ha-Nevukhim*. This translation was called *Liber de uno Deo benedicto* (‘Book of the one blessed God’). The preface which is chapter one of the *Liber* contains a collection of twenty-six preparatory sentences or premises. The first twenty-five of these premises are a collection of sayings of the Aristotelian philosophers mainly concerning the eternity of movement. Since Maimonides held them self-evident he gives no further comments on them. The twenty-sixth premise is according to Maimonides held true by the Aristotelians whereas Maimonides says it was only “possible – that is, neither necessary, as is affirmed by the commentators of the writings of Aristotle, nor impossible, as is claimed by the Mutakallimun.” In chapter I of the second book Maimonides gives proofs of God’s existence, of His unity, and of His incorporeal being. The main ideas of these proofs are: First, since there is movement somebody must have started it. This mover must be incorporeal, one and beyond time because otherwise he needed somebody or something that moved him before. Second, since there is a mover and something moved, there must be a prime mover. Third, there must be something existing whose existence is necessary and without an external reason. In addition, this existent has no composition. Therefore it is neither a corpus nor a force in a

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19 Translation: Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Shlomo Pines, with an Introductory Essay by Leo Strauss, Chicago 1963, 241. The Latin translation of that passage in the *Liber de uno Deo* has: “Et quod mihi videtur est quod hoc preparatorium sit possibile non necessitatis sicut dicunt glossatores dictorum Aristotelis quia iudicamus ambigua que sunt emergentia contra illos” (ed. Kluxen, I 77, 12-14). That translation proves that it is a difficult task to find the version the translators used for their translation.
Fourth, since everything must pass from potentiality to actuality there must be an earliest stage on which there is only the actual essence and no potentiality. This actual or pure essence is the deity that is incorporeal and one. Fifth, since two deities must have something in common God must be one because in Him there is only necessary being. Sixth, since all, which is, is one this demonstrates that the cause of its existence is one. Finally, seventh, since every corpus is compound whereas the necessary-being cannot be compound, God is incorporeal.

In the beginning or in the middle of the 1240s this translation was used for the first time by Albert the Great and Moneta of Cremona. (Wolfgang Kluxen is wrong in his assumption that the translation was already used in the beginning of the 1230s.) Perhaps Thomas Aquinas, too, read that translation – but this is only an assumption because Aquinas never mentions the title of the works used by Maimonides. With this translation Maimonides became, from a Christian point of view, one of the Arabic Aristotelians.

But there is not only that partial translation of the More ha-Nevukhim but also a translation of most of its parts which is called Dux neutrorum. That translation contains all three books of the Guide for the Perplexed, some of the chapters, especially in its first

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20 See Kenneth Seeskin, Metaphysics and its Transcendence, in ibid., The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides, 82-104.
21 See Hasselhoff (2004), o.c., 88-122 with further literature, especially 93-108 (for Albert) and 91-93 (for Moneta).
part, in an abbreviated form. Some manuscripts are added by a list of all 613 Mosaic laws. This list of precepts is taken from one version of *Mishneh Torah*. The translation of the rest was made from the second Hebrew version by Yehuda al-Charizi. We do not know who the translators are and where that particular translation was made. As I have recently argued it seems to have been translated in Paris in the early 1240s. Perhaps among the translators might have been the before-mentioned Thibaut (Theobaldus) of Sézanne and Nicholas Donin, the chief-opponent in the Parisian Talmud trials in the beginning of the 1240s.²⁴

To summarise that first point. My thesis is that the Rabbi Moyses of the Latin speaking world – especially in the 13th century – was less than the Moshe ben Maimon of the Arabic and Hebrew speaking world. Only small parts of his large and encyclopaedic oeuvre had been accessible to Thomas Aquinas. To put it differently:

²⁴ See Hasselhoff (2004), o.c., 123-25. A question that came up during the discussion of this paper during the conference ‘Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas’ (Leusden/Utrecht, December 2005) concerns the alleged burning of Maimonidean writings in Montpellier in 1230/2. The problem with this burning is that the contemporary sources are only of limited reliability. One author is Abraham Maimonides who lived in Egypt and could not eye-witness the burning. The other author is Hillel of Verona who in about 1280 wrote in a letter on that burning. He accused the anti-Maimonidean party of having burned the writings. It appears that he invented that burning of 1230/2 or mixed it up with the condemnation of Maimonidean works after the disputation of Barcelona. (These documents are published by Heinrich Denifle, Quellen zur Disputation Pablos Christiani mit Mose Nachmani zu Barcelona, in *Historisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft* 8 (1887), 225-244; additional material is published by Yitzhaq (Fritz) Baer, The Disputations of R. Yehiel of Paris and of R. Moshe ben Nahman, in *Tarbiz* 2 (1930/31), 172-187 [185-187]). A second problem with that alleged burning concerns the members of the board of inquisition. According to Hillel it were the Dominicans who burned the Maimonidean writings. According to Lothar Kolmer, *Ad capiendas Vulpes. Die Ketzerbekämpfung in Südfrankreich in der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts und die Ausbildung des Inquisitionsverfahrens*, Bonn 1982, the Dominican inquisition is testified only after 1234. In addition, Colette Sirat (Les manuscrits du Talmud en France Nord au XIIIe siècle, in *Le brûlement du Talmud à Paris 1242-1244*, Gilbert Dahan (ed.), Paris 1999, 121-139, cf. 125) shows that the burning of Maimonidean writings seems to be a Hillelian fiction.
Aquinas seems to have made use only of one or two of the partial translations of Maimonides' philosophical works without knowing that the Jew also wrote several halakhic and medical works.

2. Maimonides on God in Thomas Aquinas' works

In this part I have to proceed in two steps. First, I will focus on one particular text by Thomas Aquinas which owes much to Maimonides without mentioning his name, and second I will turn to one example where Thomas refers to 'Rabbi Moyses'.

One text by Aquinas which sometimes is compared to Maimonidean thoughts is the second question of the *Summa theologiae* (part I) in which Thomas gives proofs of God's existence. Although Thomas' proofs of God's existence might be quite well-known I shall give a short introduction. First, the place of the proofs is remarkable. In the first *quaestio* of the *Summa* Thomas states his understanding of doctrine. This 'general' introduction leads to the explanation of the structure of the work which is divided into three parts, the first deals with God (*de deo*), the second with the rational creature and its movement towards God (*de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum*) and finally with Christ as the human way to God (cf. *STh* I, q. 2 prol.). This introductory remarks lead to three articles concerning the question whether God exists. In the first inquiry Thomas asks whether God is known *per se* (a. 1). Thomas' answer

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offers a certain dialectic. For him, God is his own being. That is for sure. But since Thomas (and with him we) does (do) not know, who God is, the statement of his existence per se needs proofs. In the second article Thomas asks whether it is possible to give a proof of God's existence. Of course, Thomas can give proofs which are generally subdivided into two categories. The first category comprises the causes (per causam) and is called propter quid, i.e. 'because of'. The second category comprises the effects (per effectum) and is called quia, i.e. 'that'. Since the effects always can be seen, God's being can be demonstrated by them. Therefore in the third article Thomas asks whether God is. As usual in scholastic argumentation Thomas states that He is not and gives three reasons for this negative answer. He then gives a short argument in contrary quoting from Exodus 3,14 that God himself introduced himself as the one who is (Ego sum qui sum). Only now the famous five ways are introduced. The first way demonstrates the first mover (primum movens), the second the first cause (causa efficientis). The third way aims at the necessity in itself which causes all other necessities. The fourth way again aims at the first cause of all entities and finally the fifth way at the τελος of all being.

So far I did not present much new. But something else is worth being mentioned. Namely, that Thomas' proofs depend on at least two authors. First on Albert the Great who in his Commentary on the Sentences collected seven Aristotelian and Maimonidean arguments as proofs for God's existence.27 That particular text is seldom mentioned in connection with the five ways. And second on Moses Maimonides.28 Especially the third way is quite similar to Maimonidean formulations which are taken from the first chapter of the second part of the Guide for the Perplexed.29 Interestingly, not only the five ways but also the next quaestiones are heavily

27 Albertus Magnus, In II Sent d. I, B, a. 10 (Opera [Borgnet] vol 37, 24a-26a.
28 And in part on Avicenna / Ibn Sina.
dependent on Moses Maimonides. But in no place he is referred to by name with two exceptions.

The two exceptions where Thomas Aquinas refers to ‘Rabbi Moyses’ are questions 13 and 22. In *quaestio* 13 Thomas deals with God’s names. In the response of the second article Thomas states that names which are said of God in negation (or in a negative way) or which indicate a relation between creator and creation do not signify His substance. Instead they rather say something about the relation of the creatures to God. But concerning the affirmative names, e.g. *bonus*, *sapiens* etc., there are several different opinions which Thomas summarises. The first of these opinions is the one by Rabbi Moyses who said that even if something is said about God in an affirmative way it is said only as a means to exclude other attributions. For example, if God is called the ‘living’ it is just said to distinguish Him from the in-animate things. For Thomas this position – together with another – appears to be inconvenient for three reasons. First, it is not clearly understandable why some names could be said about God, but others could not. Therefore all names, and this is the second reason, could be said from God only in second line (*posterius*). Thirdly, an attribution such as ‘living’ (*vivens*) aims to say more than simply stating not ‘non-living’.

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30 And later on q. 50 a. 3.
31 *STh* I, q. 13 a. 2: “Utrum aliquod nomen dicatur de Deo substantialiter.”
32 Ibid.: “Respondeo dicendum de nominibus que negative de Deo dicuntur vel que relationem ipsius ad creaturam significat manifestum est quod substantiam eius nullo modo significat sed remotionem aliquidus ab ipso vel relationem eius ad alium vel potius aliquidus ad ipsum.”
33 Ibid.: “Quidam enim dixerunt quod hec omnia nomina sunt ad aliquid removendum a Deo quam ad aliquid ponendum in ipso. Unde dicunt quod cum dicimus Deum esse viventem significamus quod.”
34 Ibid.: “Sed utrumque istorum videtur esse inconveniens propter tria. Primo quidem quia secundum neutram harum positionum posset assignari ratio quare quedam nomina magis de Deo dicerentur quam alia. Sic enim est causa corporum sicut est causa bonorum: unde si nihil aliud significatur cum dicitur Deus est bonus nisi Deus est causa bonorum poterit similiter dici quod Deus est corpus quia est causa corporum. Item per hoc quod dicitur quod est corpus removetur quod non sit ens in potentia tantum sicut materia prima. Secundo quia sequetur quod omnia nomina dicta de Deo per posterius dicerentur de ipso: sicut sanum per posterius dicitur de medicina eo quod significat hoc tantum quod sit causa sanitatis in animali quod per prius
We might say that in this particular *quaestio* the Rabbi Moyses is an authority with whom Thomas might discuss. But his position is a position to be rejected.\(^{35}\)

The same is true for the second mention in *quaestio* 22 where Maimonides is referred to on Holy providence. Thomas reports Maimonides' position on a double providence, i.e. God rules the general way of life as well as the special way of the creatures, but mankind is excepted from the special providence because of its intellectual abilities. He then rejects Maimonides because providence extends on all parts of life, general as well as special.\(^{36}\)

So, to sum up this second part we might say, concerning 'godly' questions in the *Summa theologiae* Maimonides is an authority. But in those cases in which his positions are connected with the mentioning of his name this authority is being rejected by Thomas Aquinas. Whether there is reason behind this rejection remains uncertain. Perhaps there is a connection with Thomas' ambivalent attitude towards Jews, who – in Thomas' eyes – have lost their election by the incarnation of Christ.\(^{37}\) On the other hand Aquinas is relatively tolerant towards living Jews, as can be seen from his letter to the Duchess of Brabant\(^{38}\) or by a remark in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10 a. 11.\(^{39}\)

dicitur sanum. Tertio quia hoc est contra intentionem loquentium de Deo. Aliud intendunt dicere cum dicunt Deum viventem quam quod sit causa vite nostrae; vel quod differat a corporibus inanimatis.\(^{35}\)

\(^{35}\) Only after I finished this paper I came across Rudi te Velde's interpretation of q. 13: Die Gottesnamen. Thomas' Analyse des Sprechens über Gott unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Analogie (S.th. I, q. 13), in Speer (2005), o.c., 51-76.


\(^{37}\) For this aspect see Henk Schoot and Pim Valkenberg, Thomas Aquinas and Judaism, in *Modern Theology* 20 (2004), 51-70.


\(^{39}\) For Aquinas' views on Jews see Willehad Paul Eckert, Thomas von Aquino. Seine Stellung zu Juden und zum Judentum, in *Freiburger Rundbrief* 20 (1968 [Nr. 73/6 Dez. 1968]), 30-38; Dieter Berg, Servitus
3. Conclusion

My question for this presentation stated above was whether the equation of 'Rabbi Moyses' with Moses Maimonides is correct, or to be more precise, who the 'Rabbi Moyses' of Thomas Aquinas' writings is. My answer cannot be a simple one. Of course, the Rabbi Moyses of the *Dux neutrorum* as well as of the *Liber de uno deo benedicto* has something to do with Moshe ben Maimon who in the Latin-speaking world since the 16th century is called Moses Maimonides. What I could not show here is that these translations are in some cases rather free and in some other cases the Latin text is only an abbreviation of the Maimonides of the Arabic or Hebrew texts. With regard to Thomas Aquinas this means he seems to have read quite carefully the Rabbi Moyses (Maimonides) that he could read. A comparison of the two thinkers should nonetheless be very careful.

In addition, a systematic comparison of both thinkers should have in mind that Thomas Aquinas quite often quoted from Maimonides without mentioning his name. I gave a brief example concerning the 'five ways'. I could have done the same regarding his teachings on prophecy or his teachings of the *lex vetus* (the 'old

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40 See the examples given in Hasselhoff (2004), o.c., 90 n. 4 and my short remarks above n. 19.

law'). But if we just look on all those passages in which the 'Rabbi Moyses' is referred to by name we come to a peculiar conclusion. Here we find a Jewish authority indicated by the title ('rabbi') and in one case even by the attribute 'the Jew' (iudeus) whose sayings are reported quite accurately. But afterwards they are rejected. If the Jew's authority is a positive one his name is not mentioned at all. Now one could ask why is his name not mentioned in such a case. Is it because his authority is well-known and therefore his name needs no mention? I doubt that, because in the 13th century the Dux

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43 STh I, q. 50 a. 3.

44 To be more precise, all sayings which are attributed to the Jew can be found in Maimonides' work, but not in every case it is Maimonides' opinion. In my article 'Self-Definition' I tried to show that Maimonides, of course, writes on the literal meaning of scripture, but he does so to prepare his metaphorical interpretation. Thomas only refers to Maimonides' literal explanation, but leaves out Maimonides' metaphorical explanation.

neutrorum was not as spread as it is normally said.\footnote{Wolfgang Kluxen, Literargeschichtliches zum lateinischen Moses Maimonides, in \textit{Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale} 21 (1954), 23-50.} (Elsewhere I gave a survey where and in which libraries it could have been found towards the end of the 13\textsuperscript{th} century.\footnote{Hasselhoff (2004), o.c., 126-27.} It seems that there were very few libraries to hold a copy of the \textit{Dux neutrorum}. The best example are the writings of Meister Eckhart who only very late in life was able to quote from the \textit{Dux neutrorum} itself. Before, he quoted from Maimonides only via the references in Albert's and Thomas' works.\footnote{See Hasselhoff, \textit{Self-definition}, 301-304, 306-314; Yossef Schwartz, \textit{Zwischen Einheitsmetaphysik und Einheitshermeneutik}. Eckharts Maimonides-Lektüre und das Datierungsproblem des ‘Opus Tripartitum’, in \textit{Meister Eckhart in Erfurt}, Andreas Speer and Lydia Wegener (eds.), Berlin/New York 2005, 259-279.}

Leaving that apart we can say that the authority of the ‘Rabbi Moyses’ with regard to the notion of God was rather little. The ‘Rabbi Moyses’ presented by his name was limited to questions of negative theology and to predestination. But the not-mentioned Maimonides was quite important for Thomas Aquinas because he gave a number of arguments for the proof of God’s existence (q. 2), for the in-corporeality of God (q. 3 a. 1), for a theology of the name (q. 13), and so on.
SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN
DANS LE DISCOURS PHILOSOPHIQUE
ARABE MODERNE
Un inventaire initial

Abderrazak Douay

1. Introduction

Une célèbre citation attribuée à Averroès disait que « La pensée a des ailes. Nul ne peut empêcher son envol ». A vrai dire, l’envol de la pensée de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, vers les espaces de la culture philosophique arabe, est apparu très tardivement, et avec lenteur. La raison en est que cette culture, pendant longtemps, n’a eu d’intérêt pour la pensée chrétienne du Moyen Âge, que dans la mesure où celle-ci a pu être pour elle un sujet de comparaison ou de discussion critique. C’est dans ce contexte précis, que se situe l’approche que nous vous proposons. Il s’agit donc d’une analyse de la problématique de l’introduction de la pensée du Docteur Commun de l’Eglise, dans la pensée philosophique arabe moderne. Analyse qui se concentrera sur l’essentiel des écrits en arabes sur cette question.

2. Les traductions

Tout d’abord, nous pouvons avancer que cette introduction débutait au 19e siècle, conjointement à peu près, avec ce que l’on s’accordait d’appeler communément la renaissance arabe. Plus particulièrement, avec ce regain d’intérêt, que les intellectuels et les chercheurs arabes de l’époque, commençaient à avoir pour la philosophie occidentale. Il s’en va de soi que l’émergence de ce
renouveauphilosophique, avait été favorisée par une multitude de facteurs, que nous ne pouvons pas détailler ici.  

Effectivement, et vers la fin du 19ème siècle, commençait la traduction en arabe de quelques-uns des principaux ouvrages de Saint Thomas d'Aquin: la Somme théologique. Le début de cet ouvrage, Prima pars, a été traduit par le Khoury Paul Awwad. À signaler que le traducteur a signé le cinquième volume comme « archevêque de Nazareth ».

La Somme contre les Gentils: Seulement le premier livre a été traduit en arabe par Mgr Nimatullah Abi Karam Almarouni. Cette traduction est accompagnée de nombreuses notes, tirées généralement des plus célèbres philosophes arabes.


3 Imprimerie des Missionnaires libanais, Djounieh (Liban) 1931.
Une traduction récente de ce livre, accompagnée d’une introduction intéressante et des notes, est éditée par Hassan Hanafi dans son livre *Exemples de philosophie chrétienne du Moyen Âge.* Il a utilisé la traduction française de C. Capelle (Paris 1947) en se servant aussi de celle de Paul Masaad.

L’entreprise de ces traductions était en général l’œuvre des théologiens et chercheurs chrétiens arabes de Liban, appartenant souvent à la communauté maronite. Nous supposons que les buts étaient manifestement, de connaître et faire connaître à la culture arabe moderne, le grand théologien et penseur de l’Occident médiéval. Aussi, de répondre à certaines préoccupations des chrétiens arabes du Moyen Orient, notamment de bien mener la polémique traditionnelle Islamo-chrétienne, voire même les controverses avec les autres confessions chrétiennes arabes. En fin, pour s’aider à mieux affronter la vague du darwinisme et du matérialisme, introduits dans la pensée arabe moderne, par des intellectuels chrétiens arabes eux-mêmes.


3. Les études

3.1. Essais et études


D’après les écrits arabes relatifs à notre sujet, et dont nous avons pu consulter effectivement, il ressort que le premier

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intellectuel arabe qui ait fait connaître la pensée de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, quoique d’une manière indirecte, soit le libanais Farah Antoun (1874-1922). En effet, cet écrivain chrétien avant-gardiste de son époque, lui a consacré quatre petites pages sous le titre *Saint Thomas d’Aquin et sa critique d’Averroès*. Nous nous contentons ici de signaler cet événement culturel sans nous y attarder. Nous préférons plutôt nous arrêter devant d’autres textes suffisamment significatifs, que nous aborderons brièvement, et selon leurs dates de publications.

3.2. *Abderrahmane Badawi:* 9

‘Saint Thomas d’Aquin’, dans son *Histoire de la philosophie au Moyen Âge.* 10 L’auteur commence le chapitre réservé à Saint Thomas d’Aquin par une biographie, dans laquelle il insistait principalement sur son appartenance à l’Ordre des Dominicains, son rapport avec Albert le Grand et son enseignement à l’Université de Paris. Ensuite, il donne des aperçus sur les *Commentaires*, les deux *Sommes*, et sur quelques *Questions*. Il remarque que dans les *Commentaires*, Thomas d’Aquin n’était pas totalement aristotélicien, restait encore sous l’influence augustinienne. Que, dans la *Somme Théologique* il tentait de démontrer les dogmes de la foi chrétienne par la raison, bien qu’il ne parle de la philosophie que comme servante rattachée à la foi. Selon Badawi, les livres I et II, traitant respectivement de Dieu de l’homme, sont les plus passionnants. Dans l’autre *Somme*, Saint Thomas présentait et débattait les grandes doctrines philosophiques de ses opposants. L’auteur passe ensuite à l’analyse de quelques...

3.3. Youssef Karam (1885-1959):11

'Saint Thomas d'Aquin', dans son Histoire de la philosophie européenne au Moyen Âge.12 Il s'agit d'un livre d'histoire de philosophie, destiné aux universitaires et aux intellectuels arabes. Dans le chapitre consacré au Docteur Angélique, l'auteur a présenté d'abord sa biographie et ses œuvres, mettant l'accent particulièrement sur sa vocation de grand théologien, défenseur acharné de la foi chrétienne, sur son portrait de penseur admirateur d'Aristote et conciliateur de la philosophie avec la foi. Ensuite il a analysé les principaux thèmes de la pensée thomiste: Dieu et son existence, L'essence de Dieu, La création, Les anges, L'homme, La morale, La politique, Le destin du Thomisme. Nous pouvons aisément remarquer, que notre auteur, et pendant tout son exposé, proclamait constamment et solennellement son grand enthousiasme pour la pensée du Saint Thomas d'Aquin, son éloge sincère et convaincu contre ses différents opposants. Cette attitude ne devrait


12 Chapitre 9, Maison du livre égyptien, Le Caire 1946, 169-205.
pas nous étonner, si nous nous rappelons que l’auteur est un philosophe arabe chrétien d’origine libanaise, de tendance thomiste, et disciple du philosophe français Jacques Maritain. Il est considéré, dans la pensée philosophique arabe moderne, comme le grand représentant du courant rationaliste d’inspiration thomiste.

3.4. Majid Fakhry

3.4.1. Critique des enseignements des théologiens musulmans (les Mutakallimoun) par Saint Thomas d’Aquin

Cette étude est la première dans son genre nous semble-t-il. Son objectif est d’analyser, à partir de la Somme contre les Gentils, certains aspects de la polémique entre la philosophie scolastique chrétienne et la théologie scolastique islamique au Moyen Âge, et ce à travers la critique de Saint Thomas d’Aquin des enseignements des Mutakallimoun. Selon Majid Fakhry, le point de départ de la critique de Saint Thomas est la question philosophique de l’accommodement entre, d’une part l’acceptation de l’omnipotence et la toute-puissance divine, d’autre part, l’idée que les créatures seraient dotées d’un pouvoir de libre arbitre. Dans ce contexte, il est connu notoirement, que les Mutakallimoun musulmans, particulièrement ceux appartenant à l’Achârisme, pour défendre le principe de la perfection et de la toute-puissance divine, refusaient absolument que les créatures aient la capacité d’agir librement. Pour Saint Thomas, dont

on connaît bien que l'affirmation de la création est au centre de sa pensée, c'est bien d'affirmer la perfection et la toute-puissance divine, mais cela ne devait pas aboutir forcément à la dépréciation des créatures, puisque c'est en quelque sorte, une offense à la perfection divine elle-même (168).

Pour lui, il est bien évident que Dieu est la source de l'être et la cause de tout, mais cela ne signifie pas que les créatures sont démunies et impuissantes dans leurs êtres. Un Dieu qui procure de l'être à ses créatures, et les prive en même temps de l'efficacité de réagir librement et de leurs vies et leurs actes, est un dieu avare. D'autant plus que, reconnaître le libre arbitre c'est reconnaître la possibilité de la connaissance sensible et théorique, c'est aussi donner de l'autorité à la loi morale. Sinon, les conseils, les exhortations, les préceptes, les interdictions, les récompenses et les châtiments, seraient vaines. Et Majid Fakhry pour conclure, rappelait que si l'homme a un bien constituant le fond de sa nature, ce n'est que par la grâce divine qu'il peut bien agir et atteindre à son bien surnaturel. Pour Saint Thomas donc, la grâce de Dieu consiste précisément à recréer une nature humaine dotée du libre-arbitre: il réconciliait alors la toute-puissance divine avec la liberté humaine, en faisant de la seconde l'effet de la première.

3.4.2. L'éternité du monde chez Ibn Rushd, Maimonide et Saint Thomas d'Aquin

Il s'agit d'une réflexion portant sur le problème de l'éternité du monde, à partir d'une comparaison entre trois grands penseurs du Moyen Âge, appartenant respectivement aux trois grandes religions: l'Islam, le Judaïsme et le Christianisme.

Dans son Guide des Egarés, Maimonide réfutait la thèse de l'éternité du monde avec dextérité, et sans désavouer explicitement la doctrine d'Aristote qu'il soutenait formellement. Pour lui, l'éternité du monde, ou sa création, sont indémontrables rationnellement. Néanmoins, affirmer par la voie de la foi la création du monde, c'est donner son importance à l'éthique et à l'histoire, à la destinée humaine en général.

Dans la pensée théologique chrétienne, comme on le savait déjà, la réfutation catégorique de la thèse de l’éternité du monde, et la solution décisive qu’en a proposée Saint Augustin dans sa *Cité de Dieu*, est vraisemblablement la base de toutes les solutions adoptées postérieurement par les théologiens chrétiens.

Parmi les péripatéticiens du Moyen Âge, Ibn Rushd est considéré comme le défenseur le plus acharné de cette thèse, particulièrement dans ses commentaires sur Aristote. Il rejetait explicitement l'idée de la création du monde dans le temps, et affirmait que le monde n’a pas de commencement. En plus, il concevait Dieu, à la manière d'Aristote, comme le « premier moteur », la force autonome qui stimule tout mouvement, transformant le potentiel en actuel. Et s’il est admis, qu’il avait réservé une issue probante à cette thèse, dans ses propres œuvres polémiques, notamment dans son *Traité décisif sur l’accord de la religion et de la philosophie*, et la *Destruction de la destruction*, cela ne l’avait pas protégé du tout, de la suspicion d’hérésie.

Selon l’auteur, et sur cette controverse, la position de Saint Thomas d’Aquin est exposée dans le premier tome de la *Somme théologique*, question 46, et dans d’autres œuvres. Elle est inspirée, paraît-il, et selon les dires de Saint Thomas lui même, de la conception de Maimonide. A la différence de la solution hésitante d’Ibn Rushd, la sienne était décidée et formelle: « Si le problème métaphysique de l’éternité du monde, ou de sa création, sont difficiles à démontrer par la seule lumière de la raison, il faut donc faire appel à l’autorité de la foi et de la révélation. »17 Ici, nous pouvons constater que cette position est voisine de celle adoptée, plusieurs siècles après, par le philosophe allemand Emmanuel Kant, dans sa *Critique de la Raison Pure*.

3.5. *Mikhaël Doumit:*

*St. Thomas d’Aquin, études et textes choisis.*18 A notre connaissance, il s’agit de la première monographie en arabe consacrée entièrement

17 *Etudes dans la Pensée Arabe*, 196.
18 Dar *Al-Machriq*, Imprimerie Catholique, Beyrouth 1956. Au temps où il a écrit ce livre, Mikhaël Doumit était professeur de théologie à l’Université Saint-Joseph à Beyrouth. Une autre petite monographie en collection de poche, est publiée au Liban quarante ans après, par la Maison des livres
à Saint Thomas d'Aquin. L'auteur commence par soulever une remarque: « [...] dans notre langue arabe, nous n'avons trouvé aucune étude sur cette illustre figure de la philosophie scolastique médiévale qui est Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Ce qui y est traduit de ses œuvres est rare et inaccessible. Il est dommage que la pensée de ce grand penseur soit à la portée des seuls lecteurs latins, et reste toutefois inconnue de notre culture [...]. Notre livre vise à combler ce manque, et à faire connaître sommairement aux lecteurs arabes quelques aspects de cette pensée. »

Cette monographie contient un condensé de la vie et l'œuvre de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, un petit chapitre sur lui comme commentateur et critique des philosophes, un autre sur son conflit avec ses opposants averroïstes, un court exposé des thèmes de sa pensée: De Dieu, De l'âme, De la connaissance, De la liberté de l'homme, Des religions, De l'éternité du monde, de la connaissance divine des choses particulières, de l'intellect agent. Enfin, des textes choisis.

L'auteur qui n'indiquait pas ses références bibliographiques, défendait ardemment les positions et les thèses du Docteur Angélique, surtout en ce qui concerne le rapport entre la foi chrétienne et la raison philosophique. Selon lui: avant Saint Thomas les croyants craignaient pertinemment les assauts de la raison, après lui la raison est devenue l'alliée et la compagne fidèle de la foi (100).

3.6. *Mahmoud Kassem:*

*Théorie de la connaissance d'après Averroès et son interprétation chez Thomas d'Aquin.*

Dans cet essai, l'auteur avertissait, que son but n'était pas de critiquer Saint Thomas d'Aquin, ou de sous-estimer son importance au sein de la pensée théologique et philosophique chrétienne du Moyen Âge. Sa grande influence sur scientifiques. Son auteur s'appelle Mohamed Awida. Elle est moins intéressante.

19 Doumit, o.c., 97-99.
cette pensée, et sa contribution à son évolution ultérieure, sont évidentes. Ce qu’il souhaiterait plutôt, c’est de contribuer à l’éclaircissement du véritable rôle d’Ibn Rushd dans sa constitution. En même temps réhabiliter ce dernier et lui rendre justice.


A la question comment St Thomas d’Aquin (mort en 1274) a pu connaître cette véritable philosophie d’Ibn Rushd (mort en 1198), alors que les livres originaux de ce dernier, évoqués précédemment, étaient totalement inconnus, pour la simple raison qu’ils n’étaient pas encore traduits en latin, l’auteur répondait – quelques preuves à l’appui – que cela était possible grâce à l’aide de ses confrères dominicains, notamment de Raymond Martin, l’auteur célèbre du Pugio fidei. Le véritable Ibn Rushd était donc tout simplement un bouc émissaire. Averroès latin est un mythe qui a été créé dans des circonstances particulières de l’histoire politique, religieuse, et philosophique de l’Occident chrétien du Moyen Âge.

21 Kassem, o.c., 27-45.
22 Ibid., 57.
23 Sans rapport avec cette thèse, nous signalons que Abderrahmane Badawi, dans son Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam, précisait qu’il existait effectivement une traduction latine d’un de ces trois livres d’Averroès, publiée dans le Pugio fidei (752).
Cette thèse est développée amplement depuis par l’auteur dans son livre *Etudes de philosophie islamique en arabe.*

Mahmoud Kassem exposait sa thèse en s’appuyant sur trois éléments :
1. En évoquant une idée très connue d’Ernest Renan: « Saint Thomas est à la fois le plus sérieux adversaire que la doctrine averroïste ait rencontré, et, on peut le dire, sans paradoxe le premier disciple du Grand Commentateur [...] Saint Thomas comme philosophe doit presque tout à Averroès, le plus important des emprunts qu’il lui a faits c’est sans contredire la forme même de ces écrits philosophiques. »
2. En rappelant le contenu d’une thèse apparemment voisine, du célèbre orientaliste espagnol Miguel Asin Palacios. Voici un bref résumé de cette thèse. Pour l’orientaliste espagnol, les opinions religieuses de Saint Thomas d’Aquin sont une interprétation fidèle des vraies opinions religieuses averroïstes. La place d’Ibn Rushd dans l’Islam est identique à celle de Thomas d’Aquin dans le christianisme. Cette étrange concordance d’opinions, est inexplicable par la simple hypothèse de l’association des idées; la relation intellectuelle indirecte entre les deux grands penseurs étant suffisamment démontrable, logiquement et historiquement. Il est certain que Maimonide était un excellent médiateur, mais il n’était pas le seul. L’activité culturelle et scientifique des dominicains, surtout dans le domaine des études arabes, avait joué un rôle important dans le tissage de cette relation de pensée. En effet les écrits du dominicain Raymond Martin constituaient, selon Asin Palacios, une aide inestimable pour Thomas d’Aquin: ils lui avaient permis de connaître parfaitement les opinions religieuses authentiques d’Ibn Rushd.

24 Dar Al-Maarif, Le Caire 1967, 63-68.
3. En exposant ses propres remarques résultantes de la comparaison, de quelques textes des deux grands penseurs, sur des problématiques communes précises.

3.7. Zaynab al-Khodayri:


Le problème de la création du monde: Saint Thomas d’Aquin admettait que la création du monde, dans le temps et ex-nihilo, soit indémontrable par les preuves de la raison philosophique, tout comme l’éternité du monde est insoutenable par ces mêmes preuves. Mais nous devons croire à la création du monde, parce que la révélation nous l’avait enseignée; parce que c’est une doctrine de la foi chrétienne. Il admettait aussi que cette création soit préservée et renouvelée continuellement par Dieu, et que le rapport des

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créatures au Créateur devait être pensé à travers le concept de la participation.


4. Conclusion

Dans les pages qui précèdent, nous avons essayé de vous présenter quelques idées sur l’introduction de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, dans la pensée philosophique arabe moderne. Pour les conclure, nous disons que Saint Thomas d’Aquin était parmi les penseurs chrétiens du Moyen Âge, le plus cité et étudié dans la pensée philosophique arabe moderne. Il y était invoqué dans les traités de l’histoire des grandes interprétations de l’aristotélisme moyenâgeux; ainsi que dans la plupart des essais sur la pensée arabo-islamique moderne, particulièrement dans les nouvelles lectures d’Averroès et d’Al-Ghazâlî. Les principaux sujets de discussions soulevés par sa pensée, sont souvent en forme de comparaison, et tournent autour des thèmes chers à la philosophie médiévale, tels que: Dieu, le monde et la
création, la raison et la foi, l'homme et sa destinée, le statut de la philosophie. Sa pensée, vue de son côté philosophique surtout, est introduite dans notre culture philosophique arabe moderne, dès la deuxième moitié du 19ème siècle, mais très lentement. D'abord par le biais des traductions, pour répondre à des préoccupations à la fois religieuses et universitaires, ensuite par des traités en arabe, de l'histoire de la philosophie occidentale, ou comparée. Les monographies sont rarissimes.

La pensée de Saint Thomas d'Aquin est perçue, dans le discours philosophique arabe moderne, de différentes manières, et sur plusieurs niveaux. Chez les intellectuels chrétiens arabes, particulièrement dans la communauté maronite du Liban, grâce à laquelle nous devons la traduction en arabe de ses principaux ouvrages, également chez les Dominicains arabes, le grand théologien et penseur de l'occident médiéval est reçu comme le fervent croyant et défenseur de la foi catholique, le grand conciliateur de la philosophie avec celle-ci. Il est celui qui est parvenu remarquablement, mieux qu'aucun autre philosophe ou théologien chrétien avant lui, à mettre la connaissance de son temps au service de cette foi. Et comme disait précédemment un professeur de théologie libanais: « Avant Saint Thomas, les croyants craignaient toujours les assauts de la raison, après lui, la raison est devenue l'alliée et la compagne fidèle de la foi. »

Dans les traités en arabe de l'histoire de la philosophie, tels ceux de Youssef Karam, Abderrahmane Badawi, et Majid Fakry, on y parlait de Saint Thomas d'Aquin comme penseur, avec estime et respect. On y lui reconnaît son grand rôle dans l'évolution postérieure de la pensée théologique occidentale. On se permettait aussi de dire que, si l'histoire de la pensée humaine, et surtout celle de l'espace culturel méditerranéen, a voulu que les deux grandes figures intellectuelles du Moyen Âge, Averroès et Saint Thomas d'Aquin, s'entrecroisent, quoique appartenant à des terres et des univers culturels et religieux différents, voire même se rivalisent indirectement par des « Averroïstes latins » interposés, il est certain

29 Signalons ici, plus particulièrement les importantes contributions du Père Georges Chehata Anawati (1905-1994), philosophe égyptien de langue française. Fondateur de l'Institut Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales (L'IDEO) basé au Caire.

30 Doumit, o.c., 100.
que chacune d'elles a eu son propre impact dans sa culture d'origine. Il est évident que l'impact d'Averroès sur la sienne, ne commençait hélas à apparaître que beaucoup plus tard, et cela nous mène à une autre histoire.

Enfin, dans la catégorie de quelques chercheurs et d'intellectuels arabes contemporains, bien ancrés dans la culture arabo-musulmane et suffisamment familiarisés avec la culture moderne, partisans d'un renouveau du rationalisme à l'Averroès, adapté à notre temps, Saint Thomas d'Aquin est évoqué avec respect, mais souvent comme l'allié occidental d'Avicenne et d'Al Ghazali, contre le rationalisme philosophique tout court, et contre une certaine politique et une certaine vision de la société. Cet ensemble d'auteurs plaident toujours en faveur d'un rationalisme arabe ouvert et imprégné de l'universalisme, vivant avec l'éthique moderne, celle du dialogue et de la tolérance, de la démocratie et des droits de l'homme.31

Nous voilà donc parvenu à la fin de cet inventaire initial, relatif aux écrits sur la pensée et l'œuvre de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, dans la pensée philosophique arabe moderne. Nous espérons sincèrement avoir réussi à présenter quelques idées, sur un sujet qui ne nous paraît guère traité auparavant, et dont nous ambitionnons pouvoir y revenir une autre fois, afin de mieux le cerner et l'enrichir.

Summary

In this article we present an analysis of the introduction of the thought of Thomas Aquinas in modern Arabic philosophic thought. Since the second half of the 19th century the thought of Thomas Aquinas is slowly introduced in modern Arabic philosophic culture, first by means of translations – to answer concerns of at the same moment nuns and academics – then by essays in Arabic on the history of western philosophy. Towards the end of the 19th century, the translation in Arabic of some of the main works of Thomas Aquinas started: the Summa Theologiae, the Summa contra Gentiles,  

31 Nous pouvons citer ici entre autres, parmi les maghrébins Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelmajid Turki, Mohammed Arkoun, parmi les orientaux: Mourad Wahba, Atef Al-Iraqi, Mahmoud Amine Alem, Majid Fakhry, George Hourani, Muhsin Mahdi.
On Being and essence. These translations were generally the work of theologians and arabic christian researchers in Lebanon.

Thomas Aquinas is among the Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages the most quoted and studied in the modern Arabic philosophic thought. He is being mentioned in the descriptions of the history of medieval aristotelisme as well as in most of the attempts on modern Arabian-Islamic thought.
DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE IN THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS
‘Hallowed be thy name’

Fáinche Ryan

1. Introduction

Though God is shrouded in mystery, the questing spirit strives to draw near to God, to behold God’s graciousness and to perceive something of God’s relation to [humanity] and the world. The whole endeavour of religion may be said to consist in bridging the gap between the finite and the infinite and thus to endow human life with sanctity and spiritual purpose.¹

This paper will explore how the questing spirit of Thomas sought to bridge the gap between the finite and the infinite by seeking, from amidst the myriad of names available to him within the rich Judeo-Christian tradition, the most appropriate name for the mystery that is God. The title itself indicates the centrality of the act of naming to the Christian tradition, from both a theological and a prayer perspective. While the ‘and’ suggests the two activities might be separable this is questionable as underpinning the paper is the understanding that theology expresses itself most completely in the activity of prayer; the two together finding highest expression in the awe-inspiring gift of knowing God’s name(s). This activity of naming God, what might be termed ‘God-talk,’ so fundamental to the pursuit of theology, seeks to make immanent the transcendence of God so that God may be known.² That God can be known, and for

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² It does this despite, indeed even because of what Herbert McCabe calls, our special ignorance of God. H. McCabe, Appendix 3, Signifying...
Thomas God is infinitely knowable \((STh\ I,\ q.\ 12)\), is pivotal for it is by coming to know God that we can truly become like God. In essence we are talking here about the process of divinisation, becoming truly \textit{ad imaginem Dei}. This is the centre of the theological enterprise, to try and name this 'knowable' God and in the process to grow 'into' godliness. However it is not a simple task. As Thomas seeks to put into words his thoughts, he finds himself forced to stretch language to a new level, to give a new meaning to everyday language. And even yet this language will inevitably fail to find a satisfactory name for this God who is totally transcendent.

Although Thomas teaches that the name 'God' read as a proper name is \textit{incommunicabile} \((STh\ I,\ q.\ 13,\ a.\ 9)\) we, with Thomas, are seeking a name that is \textit{communicabile} – can be applied metaphorically – not in its essence but in its meaning.³ God is named in order that the divine transcendence may become immanent in the life of a believer; it is by naming the divinity that one comes to knowledge of the reality signified by the name.⁴ Moses is given a name so that he can “say to them” \((sic\ dices\ eis)\). God is revealed so


³ Article 9 of question 13 is key. Thomas is unequivocal, as we do not know what God is we cannot express in language what God is. However, from divine effects we do know that God is, hence we can use words taken from human perfections and apply them to God. These words are understood as pertaining to God in an eminent way, God is at once the ground and source of these perfections and yet distinct from them. \((STh\ I,\ q.\ 13, a.\ 8\ ad.\ 2)\) The divine essence, what God is, “exists per se singly and is individualized in itself, since it is not in any matter [...] the divine essence is predicated of God, so that we say: God is God’s own essence.” \((ScG\ I, c.21)\) In other words, God’s essence is God’s existence. From our perspective Thomas’ way of explaining this is of particular relevance: “This sublime truth Moses was taught by the Lord: for when he asked the Lord \((Exod.\ 3:13-14)\): If the children of Israel should say to me: What is His name? what shall I say to them? the Lord answered: I AM WHO AM [...] Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS hath sent me to you; thus declaring His own name to be: HE WHO IS. Now every name is appointed to signify the nature or essence of a thing. Wherefore it follows that God’s very existence itself is God’s essence or nature.” \((ScG\ I, c. 22)\) See also \textit{De Ente et Essentia}, c.4 and c.5; \textit{STh}\ I, q.\ 13, a.\ 1\ c.

⁴ “Nomen non competit voci nisi secundum quod facit notitiam de re; nomen enim dicitur quasi notamen.” \((In\ IV\ Sent.,\ d.\ 3,\ a.\ 2a,\ ad.\ 9)\)
that God may be made known. So, although our language will always be inadequate the alternative of trying to name the deity is to remain silent, and to keep ’God’ “secret”. It is this paradox of visible/invisible, knowable/unknowable, nature/supernature, immanent/transcendent that provides the ambience wherein all ‘God-talk’ (Christian theology) is done. A ‘natural’ human faculty is used to speak of a supernatural deity. As we join in Thomas’ attempt to find the ‘most proper name of God’ we advance cautiously aware of the delicacy of the exercise. If language is distorted – if the name does not truthfully and adequately reflect the intentions of God in creation – the project of growing into the fullness of humanity, indeed of becoming divine, will be inhibited.

The focus of this paper will lie particularly on Thomas’ reading of the text from Exodus 3:13-14 where this transcendent God reveals God’s very self through the medium of human language to the man Moses. This is the focus of Sth I, q. 13, a. 11. We shall also explore articles 8 to 10 as here Thomas begins his search for the name peculiar to God. In these articles Thomas suggests some possible terms Christians can use to name God. We shall accompany him as he seeks to identify the most appropriate, for – as shall be shown – all names for the divinity are not equal, there exists a ‘hierarchy’ of naming. Before engaging in the activity of naming God some background material is essential. Hence a paragraph shall be devoted to a discussion on the importance of the act of naming, this will be followed by an account of the distinction between the res significata and the modus significandi. A summary description of the term ‘analogy’ as it applies to this work of Thomas shall complete this introductory session. The paper shall then proceed to examine in some detail the three names Thomas accords to the divinity in his work in Sth I, q. 13 – ‘God’, ‘qui est’, ‘Tetragrammaton’.

1.1. Naming, an Entry into Relationship

Before entering into the articles proper a few words are needed to put the paper in context, and to facilitate entry into the theological thought of Thomas Aquinas. In this activity of naming God Thomas works very much in the tradition of the Jewish Rabbis, and their

5 Indeed as we progress we shall in fact suggest four ‘ways of naming God’ as we take into account ‘ego sum qui sum’.
efforts to reach a fuller comprehension of the divine by ‘naming God.’ In other words here we can expect to see Thomas, the magister in sacra pagina in action. The God Thomas seeks to name, following in a long (and ongoing) theological tradition, “is essentially nameless.” Moreover, as Philo tells us, God “needs no name” (Life of Moses, 1.75). Yet, “names of God are spiritual necessities. They stem from human habits of thought and of speech.” It is precisely in this paradox of a ‘Being’ which needs no name yet one which many believers spend their whole life seeking to name, that Thomas seeks to portray the simultaneity of the divine transcendence and the immanence of God. For, although as Philo tells us, God needs no name, we need a name. Naming is a fundamental human activity, an entry into relationship – it is amongst the first thing we do for a new born baby, gift them with a name. This rich significance of naming has always been acknowledged in the Judaic-Christian story and its importance recognised in the Christian liturgical action of baptism, the sign that someone is entering into the sacra doctrina of the Trinitarian God. The trust God has shown in humanity by allowing us take the risk of naming our Creator, illustrates the great gift that language is, and not least of the awesome responsibility it carries with it.

1.2. Res significata, Modus significandi

Another important point to mention is Thomas’ humility before God. Thomas is confident that the supremely knowable God can be named, and yet aware that all names, whether they be abstract, to signify God’s simplicity, or concrete, to signify God’s substance and perfection, “fail to express God’s mode of being [...] as our intellect does not know God in this life as God is” (STh I, q. 13, a.1, ad. 2). “We can only describe God as far as we understand God” (STh I, q.

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6 Cohon, The Name of God, 582.
7 Ibid.
8 The story of Gen. 32: 24-32, Jacob wrestling with God, is remarkable. In these few verses we find the concepts of blessing, naming and seeing God face to face linked. Not unlike what we are suggesting Thomas is doing with his Summa Theologiae. Indeed as Jewish tradition holds Adam was involved in the finding of names for God’s creation. This story will be related in our conclusion. See Cohon, The Name of God, 579-604: 599.
13, a. 1, ad. 3) hence human terms will always signify imperfectly “since our manner of signifying will be tied to our experience.” In an attempt to speak of a divinity that greatly exceeds human capacity for verbalisation Thomas carefully notes that God “can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies God expresses the divine essence in itself” (STh I, q. 13, a. 1 c). The names used to speak of God, the adjectives used to describe the Divinity belong more properly to God than to creatures with regard to the res significata. Names such as good, or wise, “signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of God. [...] For these names express God, so far as our intellects know God” (STh I, q. 13, a. 2 c). Perfections such as goodness or wisdom or holiness although first known from their existence in creatures “are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures” for “they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to God” (STh I, q. 13, a. 3 c). Paradoxically, these words “do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures” (STh I, q. 13, a. 3 c) with regard to their modus significandi. Speaking about God is an important and delicate enterprise where the words we use can only “try to mean” what God is like. Human words will always miss their mark. As Anna Williams astutely comments, the problem of naming God, “of speaking of God, lies not on the divine side but on the human side, in the modus significandi that is human language.”

1.3. Analogy

Yet while the res significata and the modus significandi speak of the distinction between the two modes of being, divine and human, this gap is greatly narrowed, even bridged by Thomas’ understanding of

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analogue discourse. There is a middle way between a language that reduces God to the level of creatures (univocal discourse) and a system of thought which denies that anything meaningful can be said of God (equivocal language) (STh I, q. 13, a. 5 c). Human words can be used to speak of God. Names such as good and wise pertain to God essentially, signifying “not only that God is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in God in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures” (STh I, q. 13, a. 6 c). In seeking to speak of God’s goodness by using the word ‘good’ of God one is not straying outside of its normal meaning but trying to enter more deeply into it. In contemporary language this is generally termed analogue predication.

For Thomas analogy “is a comment on our use of certain words.” H. McCabe, Appendix 4, Analogy, in Summa Theologiae, Vol.3, Knowing and Naming God (1a. 12-13), Blackfriars, 1964, 106-107: 106. Working from a philosophical perspective Ralph McInerney in his Aquinas and Analogy, Washington D.C. 1996, gives a clear account of analogy Thomas. His work is of particular interest as he works mainly from primary text. The variety of manners in which Thomas’ analogy of being has been interpreted over the years is well documented in B. Montagnes, La doctrine de l’analogie de l’être d’après saint Thomas d’Aquin, Philosophes médiévaux t.VI, Louvain/Paris 1963. From a more theological perspective see David B. Burrell (2005), o.c., 77-98. A short, interesting and pertinent account is to be found in T.-D. Humbrecht, La théologie négative chez saint Thomas d’Aquin, in Revue Thomiste 93 (1993), 535-566: 540-542. In addition, fifty years after it was written, Victor White’s clear, straightforward discussion of analogy in his essay ‘Talk About God’, is still has much to recommend it. V. White, God the Unknown and other essays, London 1956. See also C. Morerod, Écumenisme et philosophie. Questions philosophiques pour renouveler le dialogue. Parole et silence, Paris 2004, 68-72 and F. Kerr, After Aquinas. Versions of Thomism, Oxford 2002, 239 note 13.


McCabe, Analogy, 106-107.
Thomas' theology, although at times apophatic, is so only to remind us of the total otherness of the God we wish to know, and according to the preceding question 12, can know to some extent. This is the dilemma, the complexity of the human condition, and indeed the task of theology, to make present the mystery that is God. Indeed it is for this we were created, to know God and to become like unto God (STh I, q. 12, a. 5 c).\textsuperscript{14} That names can be “said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion” (STh I, q. 13, a. 5 c) implies a degree of similarity between God and the creature seeking to name God, the human created \textit{ad imaginem dei}. The discipline of theology itself is rooted in this claim. Implicit to Thomas' use of analogical discourse is the understanding that there exists a certain “proportionality between the mind and God.”\textsuperscript{15} God's objective presence in the intellect can “conform” the mind and so bring “the mind to participate in God’s personal life to some extent.”\textsuperscript{16} This conforming of the mind to God is a reference to nothing other than the deification of a human person. The transcendent becoming immanent in what God has created. This objective presence, through which a person shares more and more in God's goodness and holiness and wisdom, to name but a few attributes, may be described as the Holy Spirit active and speaking through the human.

2. ‘God’

2.1. \textit{Verb or Noun?}

Article 8, where Fergus Kerr interestingly suggests that Thomas "considers whether the word ‘God’ is a noun or a verb" makes a good point of entry to the discussion.\textsuperscript{17} John Damascene is cited to explain why ‘God’ cannot be the name of a nature (a noun). What Damascene has to say is interesting. Different possibilities for the roots of the Greek word \textit{theos} are suggested. He proposes a


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} Kerr, \textit{After Aquinas}, 187. Much of what follows is guided by Fergus Kerr’s thoughts.
derivation from the verb *thein*, which may be interpreted as to cherish or to take care of things, or *theos* may come from "*aihein*, which means to burn" or from *theasthai*, to contemplate, to consider. Thomas' response to Damascene suggests a large degree of agreement, if, he qualifies, we understand that everything that Damascene says refers to Divine Providence, God's protective care for all. Whatever the etymology of the word, it is experience of this protective care that first enabled the human to use the term 'God'. In this sense the semantics, the meaning accorded to the term 'God', "seems to designate not an entity but a process, not an object but a happening." Human experience of God, 'God's operations or effects', enabled 'God' to be named. Rudi te Velde, from his reading of this question makes the interesting suggestion that "one must even say that the meaning of the word 'God' remains unaltered through the event of revelation." Te Velde's decision to say 'must' rather than 'might' makes this statement authoritative, and emphasises Thomas' inclusive vision of God and humanity, while at the same time it augments our claim of a 'hierarchy' of naming in question 13. Revelation will feature more prominently as the question develops, and as the God we speak of 'becomes' the Christian God.

Thus far it seems that both Christian and pagan name 'God' from their common experience of the action of Divine providence in the world. God is known and named through his works and effects

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18 "Dicit enim Damascenus, in I libro, quod deus dicitur a theein, quod est currere*, et fovere universa; vel ab aethein, idest ardere (deus enim noster ignis consumens est omnem malitiam); vel a theasthai, quod est considerare, omnia. Haec autem omnia ad operationem pertinente. Ergo hoc nomen deus operationem significat, et non naturam." *STh* I, q. 13, a. 8, obj. 1. *Many manuscripts have* curare here. The Leonine corrects to currere. 19 "Omnia quae posuit Damascenus, pertinent ad providentiam, a qua imponitur hoc nomen deus ad significandum." *STh* I q. 13, a.8, ad 1.
20 Kerr, *After Aquinas*, 187. Aquinas himself recognises that "God is an operational word" (*STh* I, q. 13, a. 8 c). Contemporary scholarship's belief that the word 'theos' and its cognates have their roots in the Sanskrit verb 'di', to gleam, do not alter the thesis of Damascene.
21 Te Velde, *Aquinas on God*, 46.
22 Herbert McCabe's translation of this text is clear. "'God' is an operational word in that it is an operation of God that makes us use it – for the word is derived from his universal providence: everyone who uses the word 'God'
(STh I, q. 13, a. 1). In the very term ‘God’ both the divine transcendence and immanence of the deity are given expression. Although derived from experience of providence (id a quo imponitur nomen) the name itself signifies divine nature, “for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this” (STh I, q. 13, a. 8 ad. 2). The semantics of the word God is, in a sense, organic. In this article Thomas shows how people first become aware of God from experience of divine providence and then develop an idea of divine transcendence as awareness of God’s difference from us grows (see STh I, q. 12, a. 12 c).

This ‘God’, it seems, is both noun and verb, both transcendent and immanent. For although “this name ‘God’ is imposed to signify the divine nature” (STh I, q. 13, a. 8 c). God’s nature is activity – though activity with a certain ‘subsistency’. [...] In God, being, knowing, loving and creating are identical (the doctrine of divine simplicity); yet this activity has at the same time something of the character of a substance. In short, the risk for Thomas is not to reify God as a static and motionless entity, but rather, just the opposite, to make so much of the divine essence as activity, denying the distinction between agent and agency, that God becomes sheer process, perpetuum mobile. Thomas’s God, anyway, is more like an event than an entity.

This suggestion that “Thomas’s God [...] is more like an event than an entity” is at the root of the story of the Judaeo-Christian God. God is active in revealing Godself to those created ad imaginem Dei, furthermore Godself will provide God’s name and thus aid those

has in mind one who cares for all things.” (STh I, q. 13, a. 8 c) (Blackfriars, 1964). See also STh I, q. 13, a. 10, ad 5.

23 Kerr, After Aquinas, 190. This reading offered by Kerr provides an interesting response to many who criticise Thomas for his static concept of God, the ‘unmoving mover’, and at least opens the door for more conversation. To follow this line of thought further – an exercise which would bring this work too far from its present concern – Kerr’s chapter, ‘God in the Summa Theologiae’ in the work cited would make a good starting point.
schooled in the biblical narrative to truly become God's adopted children.24

2.2. "I have said, you are gods"

The statement, "I have said, you are gods", is cited by Thomas in both an objection and in the response (corpus; STh I, q. 13, a. 9 ob. 2 and c).25 In the declaration itself – Ego dixi, dii estis (Ps 81, 6) – the gap between humanity and God becomes less distinct. There is a sharing of whatever it is that the term 'god' signifies (see above, q. 13 a. 8) while simultaneously divine transcendence is guarded. The scripture quotation is clear – God does the naming, God chooses to share the designation 'god' with those whom God has created. God's immanence, it might be said God's indwelling, is a gift, it is grace. Hence, in response to the query whether this name 'God' is communicable (STh I, q. 13, a.9), Thomas can say both yes, and no. The name 'God' is not communicable properly, proprie, [literally] "in its whole signification", but is communicable by similitude, "those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness" (STh I, q. 13, a. 9 c).26

24 Thomas frequently uses this rich scriptural image of 'adopted sons of God'. For example see STh I-II, q. 114 c; STh III, q. 23, a. 24 ad 1, q. 32, q. 39. For theological reasons, and bearing in mind the importance of truthful language when it comes to speech about God and of humankind, we have decided to render the translation inclusive.

25 Focus on a scriptural citation of Thomas is justified, and is far more than a 'proof text' usage. "For St Thomas certainly exegesis and rational elaborations were equally part and parcel of theology (cf. I. l. 8, 9 and 10), and it must be regretted when they have drifted into two almost autonomous disciplines." V. White, St Thomas's Conception of Revelation, in Dominican Studies 1/1 (1948), 3-34: 29. Chenu identified the text of the Scriptures, both Old and New, as the place of genesis of Thomas' theology. M.-D. Chenu, Introduction à l'étude de S. Thomas d'Aquin, Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévale 11, Montreal/Paris 1954, 199. More recent studies, such as Thomas F. Ryan's Thomas Aquinas as Reader of the Psalms, Notre Dame 2000, seek to remind scholars of the centrality of sacred scripture to the thought of Thomas.

26 "Dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid divinum per similitudinem." STh I, q. 13, a. 9 c.
Thomas is speaking of what might be termed divinisation, a participation in some of the similitudes termed divine. These similitudes refer to a sharing in the perfections received from God, perfections such as 'goodness' and 'wisdom' which are communicable. It is these perfections that make some people to be termed 'godly', 'holy', even 'saints'. Hence in God's very transcendence God is immanent. The name 'God' can thus be said to apply metaphorically to those who "have some godlike characteristic, and not the full divine nature. The name 'God' applies to them, not in its full meaning, but in some aspect of it." People can become "godly".

Throughout this article Thomas is reminding the human that a finite mind can know 'God', albeit in a limited fashion. It is this knowledge that enables us to name that which we have termed 'God'. Thus the name 'God' signifies "the divine nature in the possessor" without encompassing what God is, for "names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind" (STh I, q. 13, a. 9, ad. 2). 'God' designates a nature and not a concrete being hence it is communicable, though not in reality but in thought. The overriding message is implicitly positive — 'in cognitione nostra' something can be known of this 'God' "which we experience continually" (STh I, q. 13, a. 9, ad 3). "C'est pourquoi ce nom 'Dieu' est à la fois incommunicable, selon la vérité de ce qu'il signifie, et communicable, puisque l'origine de son attribution est l'opération de la nature divine. Ce nom est pour cette raison un nomen appellativum et non pas un nom propre." This name 'God', being simultaneously communicable and incommunicable speaks of a God that is both immanent and transcendent. From what has been said thus far it appears that the name 'God' is best termed a common noun and not a proper name (est nomen appellativum et non proprium, STh I, q. 13, a. 9, ad. 2).

Thus, although content that the term 'God' can be used to speak well of the divinity, Thomas continues to wonder if there is not a more

27 "The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude." STh I, q. 13, a. 9 ad. 1.
28 Armand Maurer here is speaking with regard to STh I, q. 13, a. 9. A. Maurer, St. Thomas on the Sacred Name, in Mediaeval Studies 34 (1972), 275-286: 281.
29 Humbrecht, La théologie négative, 90.
appropriate name, one naming God and God alone, an 'absolutely incommunicable' term.

3. "He who is"

Article 11 has been identified as the "key article" of question 13, and undoubtedly it is an article that brings us further into the mystery that is God which Thomas is seeking to articulate. In this article Thomas considers whether the name qui est, 'He who is', is the most appropriate name for God. Sacred scripture features prominently. In the sed contra Thomas cites the famous passage from the book of Exodus, one that has long attracted theological attention. Thomas himself uses this passage on at least twenty occasions.

It is written that when Moses asked, “If they should say to me, ‘What is His name?’ what shall I say to them?” The Lord answered him, “Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IShath sent me to you” (Ex. 3:13,14). Therefore this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God. (STh I, q. 13, a.11 se)

Before proceeding a comment on the scriptural source of this text is insightful. That Thomas chose to use a passage from Exodus 3 is

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30 Kerr, After Aquinas, 188.
31 Thomas has wrestled with the suitability of this name 'He who is' for God in many other places. See É. Zum Brunn, La 'métaphysique de l'Exode' selon Thomas d'Aquin, in Dieu et l'être. Exégèses d'Exode 3,14 et de Coran 20, 11-24, Paris 1978, 245-269. Torrell brings to our attention a change in formula from 'Qui est' in Thomas' earlier works to 'Ego sum qui sum' in the Summa Theologiae. We shall address this observation as the paper develops. 'Qui est' is the term of choice in STh I, q. 13, a. 11. See J.P. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol.2, Spiritual Master, Transl. R. Royal, Washington D.C. 2003, 44. In a discussion on knowledge of God and the rule of causality J.-H. Nicolas enigmatically writes that concerning God "nous ne savons finalement que ceci: qu'il est. Oui, mais sachant cela nous savons quelque chose de Lui." J.-H. Nicolas, Dieu connu comme inconnu. Essai d'une critique de la connaissance théologique, Paris 1966, 143.
32 Zum Brunn, La 'métaphysique de l'Exode', 246 n. 1.
significant. Exodus 3 is where we read of an encounter between God and a human, God speaks, and what he says is important — "Come no closer! Remove the sandals from your feet, for the place on which you are standing is holy ground." (Ex. 3:5) God is about to engage in a conversation, a discourse with Moses. Indeed, God is about to teach Moses how God might be named — and as Thomas so aptly remarks — the teaching occurs in response to a question from the student (STh I, q. 13, a. 11 sc). The transcendent God chooses to become immanent with a believer, Moses. The sacred activity of naming will take place on holy ground. This activity has definite parameters, 'come no closer', thus far and no further. God wants to be known, but on God’s terms.

Is this to read too much into a simple citation from scripture? We suggest not, for it can never be forgotten that this great writer of theology was first and foremost a magister in sacra scriptura.\(^\text{34}\)

3.1. \textit{Ego sum qui sum?}

In the \textit{sed contra} of his infamous ‘five ways’, question 2 of the \textit{Prima pars}, in the reply to article 3 whether God exists, Thomas refers to this same passage in Exodus and writes: "It is said in the person of God: 'I am Who am'." (Ex. 3:14) Thomas addresses the question of God's existence by an authoritative appeal to God's self-revelation to Moses.\(^\text{35}\) It is God who names God's very self. The attentive reader will note a difference in the passage cited. According to J.-P. Torrell "in his first writings, Thomas reproduces the formula Qui est; but beginning with the \textit{Summa theologiae} he seems to prefer the more complete \textit{Ego sum qui sum}.” This division, Torrell remarks, "is not absolute: ST I a q.2 a.3 s.c. has the longer version, but \textit{Qui est}

\(^{34}\) See note 24 above.
\(^{35}\) It is significant that in this second question of the \textit{Summa}, where Thomas begins his development of the famous ‘five ways’ for the proof of God’s existence, he takes as his starting point the theophany at the burning bush. See \textit{STh} I, q. 2, a. 3 c. God exists because he spoke to Moses. The existence of God has been revealed by God to a human, hence humans have the possibility, and indeed the responsibility to speak of God. This gift-responsibility relationship is central to the vocation of a theologian. One can speak hence one must.
appears at ST I q.13 a.11.”

It is necessary to consider why Thomas may have opted for this changed formula. One could surmise that in his work on the commentary of Dionysius’ *de divinis nominibus* Thomas’ addition of a reference to Exodus 3 is used to indicate his awareness that there is another possible way to name the divinity. Yet, while working on Dionysius’ text, Thomas complies with the Dionysian designation *Ego sum qui sum*, and waits until his own work (*STh* I, q. 13, *de nominibus Dei*) to opt for the form *qui est*. The significance that might be accorded this choice shall now be shown.

Referring to the second question of the *Prima pars* Étienne Gilson suggests that the decision to place this self declaration of God regarding God’s existence precisely here – after the question on *sacra doctrina* – affirms that all theological study depends on this first truth of God’s existence. Thus it marks an essential starting point for the *Summa*.

On the other hand Émilie Zum Brunn, proposes that in the decision to use the formula *Ego sum qui sum* we witness a certain successful completion of thought: “nous semble-t-elle indiquer l’aboutissement plutôt le point de départ de l’explication théologique.” Zum Brunn relates this development in thought to both the influence of Augustine on Thomas’ thought and more importantly to Thomas’ possibly concurrent work on John’s gospel. He suggests that *Ego sum qui sum* is a “quasi-definition” of the divine nature whereas *qui est* is the name most proper to God. In a sense ‘*qui est*’ is the name by which we can address God while

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38 *In lib. B. Dion de div. nom cap. 5 lect.* 1 no. 635. See Zum Brunn, La ‘métaphysique de l’Exode’, 259 for a commentary on this section.
40 Zum Brunn, La ‘métaphysique de l’Exode’, 262.
41 According to the dating suggested by Gilles Emery Thomas would actually have completed the *Prima pars* in 1268 while the commentary on John wasn’t composed until 1270-1272. This is not to say, that in line with Zum Brunn’s hypothesis the master may not have been studying John in preparation for his later teaching. See Emery, *Brief Catalogue*. 
'Ego sum qui sum' is God's personal and 'private' name. This suggestion finds some support in Thomas' later appropriation of the name 'qui est' to the person of the begotten Son (STh I, q. 39, a. 8). Qui est seems to be the name to be shared, a name also suitable for God incarnate. Alluded to almost in passing, in the closing lines of article eight, Thomas writes that the "expression qui est is appropriated to the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, (non secundum propriam rationem, sed ratione adiuncti), inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son (quae facta est per filium)." (STh I, q. 39, a. 8 c).42 While careful not to limit the appellation qui est to the Son, Thomas' understanding of the role of this name in human salvation is of relevance.

Our reading of the Vulgate version of the text in question is not contrary to this suggestion. While the actual text Thomas used remains unknown his use of the two phrases to refer to the divinity imply that the wording cannot have been too unlike the following:

ait Moses ad Deum ecce ego vadam ad filios Israhel et dicam eis Deus patrum vestrorum misit me ad vos si dixerint mihi quod est nomen eius quid dicam eis dixit Deus ad Mosen ego sum qui sum ait sic dices filiis Israhel qui est misit me ad vos.
(Vulgate, Ex. 3:13, 14)

As well as the metaphysical sense this passage contains a theological wealth. God reveals one name to Moses, and suggests the other as a name to tell the children of Israel. This remarkable moment, the entry of God into language, is itself a journey into mystery. 'Ego sum qui sum' speaks of God as 'ipsum esse' (De Subst. Sep. 17); undoubtedly qui est also refers to God as 'being itself' but seems to be the term that the children of Israel are permitted to use to bridge the chasm, to seek to enter into relationship. Ego sum, 'I am', is reserved for God while qui est, 'he who is,' is the human mode of address. Whether an interpretation such as this influenced Thomas one can only surmise. However his decision to focus on qui est in the

42 In this case Thomas is working from a gloss on a scriptural text: "On the text of Isaias, Behold I go to the Gentiles (lxv. 1), a gloss adds, The Son speaks who said to Moses, I am Who am." STh I, q. 39, a. 8, obj. 5.
question on naming God cannot be without importance (as suggested above in the reference to STh I, q. 39, a. 8).

3.2. "Est maxime proprium nomen dei"

This identification of *qui est* and not *ego sum qui sum* as the "most properly applied to God" (STh I, q. 13, a. 11 c) is an understanding Thomas has held to firmly throughout his theological life. His first theological work, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, has identified 'He who is' as the most suitable name for God amongst all names.\(^4^3\)

All other names speak of a determined and specific being, as 'wise' speaks of a certain being; but the name 'qui est' says absolute being, not determined by something added; and that is why John Damascene says that it does not signify what God is, but 'a certain infinite ocean of substance, not determined'. That is why, when we proceed in the knowledge of God by negation, we deny immediately that God has corporeal traits, and then we even deny the intellectual traits as they are found in creatures, such as goodness and wisdom; and thus there only remains in our understanding his existence and nothing else, and our intellect then finds itself in certain confusion. Finally, *being itself*, such as it is found in creatures, is also denied of God and *God thus remains in a certain darkness of ignorance*, ignorance through which we are united to God in the best way, at least in the present life; as Dionysius says, "this ignorance is a kind of cloud in which God is said to dwell."\(^4^4\)

\(^4^3\) "Qui est, est maxime proprium nomen dei inter alia nomina." (*In I Sent.* d. 8, q. 1, a. 1) In his earlier writings (*In I Sent.*, d. 8, q.1 a.1, *Summa Contra Gentiles, Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*) St. Thomas is concerned to show that we can know something truly about God from creatures and name God suitably from the names we give to them. They are in agreement that the most appropriate name we can give to God is 'He who is', a name derived from the being imparted to creatures by God as their primal participation in God.

\(^4^4\) "Alia omnia nomina dicunt esse determinatum et particulatum; sicut sapiens dicit aliquid esse; sed hoc nomen qui est dicit esse absolutum et indeterminatum per aliquid additum; et ideo dicit Damascenus quod non significat quid est deus, sed significat quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum, quasi non determinatum. Unde quando in deum procedimus per viam remotionis, primo negamus ab eo corporalia; et secundo etiam
“Nous sommes en présence du texte le plus apophatique de toute l’oeuvre de Saint Thomas”, according to Humbrecht. While to say “the most apophatic” is perhaps rather strong, we are indeed brought into the heart of the mystery of God here. “Nous rencontrons ici l’incroyable paradoxe du discours humain sur Dieu [...] de Dieu nous ne savons rien et cependant nous parlons beaucoup de lui.” This is the heart of theology, the humility of the work of a theologian – we are invited to speak about that which can never be enclosed by words.

A return to the last article of quaestio 12 helps in the understanding of Thomas’s thought. In a.l3, ob.l we read that according to Dionysius in De mystica theologia “whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to God as to one entirely unknown” (omnino ignoto). Interestingly in Thomas’ reply there is a slight modification – it reads that a person is “united to God as to one almost unknown” (quasi ignoto). In this significant modification of the translation of Dionysius being used Thomas introduces a ‘positive’ slant to the apophatic teaching inherited, and thus he follows the thought of his teacher Albert the Great that every negation must be founded on top of some affirmation. This intellectualia, secundum quod inveniuntur in creaturis, ut bonitas et sapientia; et tunc remanet tantum in intellectu nostro, quia est, et nihil amplius: unde est sicut in quadam confusione. Ad ultimum autem etiam hoc ipsum esse, secundum quod est in creaturis, ab ipso removemus; et tunc remanet in quadam tenebra ignorantiae, secundum quam ignorantiam, quantum ad statum viae pertinet, optime deo conjungimur, ut dicit dionysius, et haec est quaedam caligo, in qua deus habitare dicitur.” In Sent. I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4. Translation taken from Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 2, 36 ff.

Humbrecht, La théologie négative, 78.
Ibid., 90.


Other places where the term quasi ignoto is found include In lib sent IV Articulus 1; ScG III, q. 49, N. 8 and In Boethius de Trinitate 1, q. 1 Articulus 2, ag 1.

“Omnis negatio fundatur supra aliquam affirmationem; unde ubi non est vere affirmatio, neque erit etiam vere negatio.” (Aberti Magni, Opera Omnia: Super Dionysii Mysticam Theologiam et Epistulam, Vol. XXXVII Pt. 2. Ed. P. Simon, Aschendorff 1977, 475.) “Moreover the idea of negation is always based on an affirmation: as evinced by the fact that every negative
affirmation of the giftedness of the human intellect is foundational to the work of theology and intimately linked with the activity of naming God. Thomas' "apophatic way is not agnosticism. Like Jacob wrestling with the angel and demanding to know his name, he does not intend to let go before he receives a blessing." The mystery can be named.

Following our excursus let us return to the text and Thomas' reasoning. The corpus of the question presents the response logically. This name, qui est, most properly belongs to God primarily because it signifies existence itself, and not simply how something looks. "God is simply 'existing' – ipsum esse: able to be designated, then, by the infinitive of the verb 'to be'." Secondly, this name belongs to God "on account of its universality" (STh I, q. 13, a. 13 c). Other names try, in a sense to form or determine what they are naming, in this case God. But, as we cannot know God in God's essence in this life, all our terms to speak of the divinity fall short, hence "the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God by us.” We are reminded of Damascene's description of God's existence as an ocean of being, infinite and unlimited. Thus Thomas is attempting the impossible, to name the unnameable, and in the process is journeying deeper into the very being of God.

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proposition is proved by an affirmative: wherefore unless the human mind knew something positively about God, it would be unable to deny anything about him (unde nisi intellectus humanus aliquid de deo affirmavit cognosceret, nihil de deo posset negare). And it would know nothing if nothing that it affirmed about God were positively verified about him. Hence following Dionysius (Div. Nom. xiii) we must hold that these terms signify the divine essence, albeit defectively and imperfectly.” De pot. q.7 a.5 c.


51 Kerr, After Aquinas, 188.

52 "Quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis propriie dicuntur de deo a nobis". STh I, q. 13, a. 11 c.

53 "Unde et Damascenus dicit quod principalius omnibus quae de deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum.” - "This name 'He Who Is' determines no mode of being but is indeterminate to all and therefore it denominates the 'infinite ocean of substance'." STh I, q. 13, a. 11 c.
The third reason he cites for the suitability of this name is again to do simply with present existence. God simply is.

Thus far Thomas has journeyed before to show his students how 'He Who Is' is most properly applied to God. In his response to the first objection Thomas teaches that the name 'He Who Is' signifies more properly God's name than 'God' because of that from which it has been named, from the origin of the name, namely esse, to be, the most perfect of actualities, (quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse) (STh I, q. 13, a. 11 ad 1). On the other hand, if we approach the act of naming quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, the name 'God' is more appropriate for it signifies the divine nature (ad significandum naturam divinam). So 'God' signifies the divine nature, the godly nature that is communicative and the divine providence that has been 'experienced', while the appellation 'He Who Is' is taken from the fust perfection, existence itself. It is also a name God applied to Godself. God is ipsum esse subsistens. Humbrecht's reading leads us toward the core of Thomas' message.

Par conséquent nous avons deux noms: "Dieu", qui dit bien la nature divine mais de manière purement désignative, et "être", qui dit bien la perfection suréminente de Dieu mais à partir des créatures. C'est pourquoi "Dieu" affirme le mode de signifier sans rejoindre le mode d'être, et "Qui est" énonce le mode d'être sans le signifier. Aucun des deux n'enclôit l'essence divine et c'est pourquoi, en dernière analyse, le "Qui est" thomasien désigne Dieu comme ineffable.

Sensitivity to the mystery of God has enabled Thomas to suggest a name for God which is rooted in the simple fact of existence, the preeminent gift shared by God with creation, without ever losing sight of the total otherness of God. God remains unknown, inscrutable, mysterious.

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54 See Maurer, St. Thomas on the Sacred Name, 275-286.
55 This distinction, or diversity of names, lies in our way of thinking (distinctio rationis tantum) and not in God (distinctio realis).
56 Humbrecht, La théologie négative, 93. Italics mine.
4. Tetragrammaton: The Peculiar Name of God

However, as always with Thomas, one must keep one's wits about one for "si on lui adjoint la réponse à la première objection tout bascule soudain." Thomas has not said all that needs to be said – the ineffable God needs yet another attempt to be named. As we proceed in our reading of q.13 a. 11 ad. 1, Thomas identifies another name as even still more proper ("et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton"). This name, 'tetragrammaton', is still more proper as it is "imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular." This recognition by Thomas of the Tetragrammaton as the most appropriate of all names, as "still more proper" than that of "He who is" or "God", represents "an important advance" over Thomas’ earlier attempts to name God and hence demands some attention.

Thomas uses this name for the divinity only three times, twice in the question under consideration, and once in the Summa contra Gentiles (IV, c.7), where it is used in a discussion aimed to establish the divinity of Christ. This sparse use does not dismay the scholar

57 Ibid.
58 For much of what follows we follow closely Maurer’s work, St. Thomas on the Sacred Name, 281-286.
59 "Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton, quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam dei substantiam incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem." STh I, q. 13, a. 11, ad 1. Maurer identifies the Summa Theologiae as the only work of Thomas that recognises a divine name more suitable than ‘He Who Is’. ‘Tetragrammaton’ as a name for God is found in the Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, c. 7. Maurer, St. Thomas on the Sacred Name, 278. The tetragrammaton, YHWH, is the name for God which Jews do not pronounce due to reverence and awe.
60 Maurer, St. Thomas on the Sacred Name, 281. Torrell goes further and notes that while the name was mentioned before (ScG 4, 7) "it is only in the Summa Theologiae that he makes this topical use of it. This is a serious shift, because Thomas situates himself not only in the perspective of the name’s origin but in the reality that the name was meant to signify. The name revealed to the believer is preferred to the name arrived at by the philosopher. Entirely singular, this is truly the name above every other name, and it refers only to God.” Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 2, 46.
61 "Further. The Apostle says (Rom. ix. 5): Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever, Amen, and (Tit. ii. 13): Looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God
Armand Maurer. On the contrary it lead him to write an article on "St. Thomas on the Sacred Name" where he remarks that of the three names Thomas identifies the ‘Tetragrammaton’ as the most suitable name for the divinity from "the perspective of that which the name has been given to signify." This choice of name assumes even greater interest when put in the context in which the name was born – the Jewish faith. Indeed, although Thomas could have got his knowledge about the sacred Hebrew name of God from the Latin theological tradition it seems his main source was Moses Maimonides, whose Guide to the Perplexed he had studied carefully and whose name is cited in this question. It is necessary to note that Thomas does not use the term YHWH but only ‘Tetragrammaton’, the name for the name of God. The term

and our Saviour Jesus Christ. Moreover it is said (Jerem. xxiii. 5, 6): I will raise up to David a just branch, and immediately afterwards: And this is the name they shall call him: The Lord, our just one; where the Hebrew has the tetragrammaton, the name that is certainly applied to God alone. Wherefore it is clear that the Son of God is truly God." ScG, IV, c.7. It is important to note the use of the term Adonai to refer to the Sacred Name, in two other questions in the Summa theologiae. In STh II-II, q. 174 Thomas speaks of the revelation of "things pertinent to faith in the Godhead" being made in "a yet more excellent way" in order that the whole people "be instructed in these matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): 'I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God almighty, and My name Adonai I did not show to them'; because previously the patriarchs had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Ex. 3:14): 'I am Who am'; and this name is signified by Jews in the word 'Adonai' on account of their veneration for that unspeakable name." STII-II, q. 174, a. 6 c. See also STh II-II, q. 1, a. 7. It is remarkable, and inviting of closer study, that as in the Summa contra Gentiles, Thomas proceeds in these passages to include reference to the revelation of the Son of God; furthermore in the Summa the Son of God is presented as revealing the mystery of the Trinity.

62 Maurer, St. Thomas on the Sacred Name, 281.
63 A Latin version of this work was produced about 1240 from the Hebrew translation of the Arabic original. See E. Synan, Maimonides, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, New York 1967, 79-81.
64 Rabbi Moses is cited in the sed contra of article 11, with respect to the name 'He Who Is'. On both occasions where the Tetragrammaton is mentioned no authority is referred to.
'Tetragrammaton' indicates to the reader that the Hebrew term YHWH (dominus is used in the Vulgate) is being referred to; Thomas cannot bring himself to write this "still more proper" name for God. Reason together with revelation indicate to Thomas that God can indeed be named, and yet faith and awe render God ultimately unnameable. One can speak not only of a metaphysics of Exodus 3 but of a semantics. The meaning attached to the term 'Tetragrammaton' brings the reader closer to the heart of the matter. In absence, one could suggest, the Holy One is ever more present. This is the path we shall now explore.

4.1. Jewish Heritage

This background in the Jewish tradition further emphasizes the transcendent/immanent discourse taking place. In Jewish thought "the recognition that God transcends all names is paradoxically coupled", according to Samuel Cohon, "with the persistence to invoke God by the right name."65 This is precisely the thinking permeating question 13. The Divine God is transcendent, and yet this same Divinity addressed Moses. Hence in the name itself one is led to expect a feeling of awe and mystery. Thomas, by choosing the Jewish term, emphasises this fact. His reticence in discussing this name - having identified it he moves on - is possibly rooted in his knowledge of what Cohon terms the "awesome sanctity with which the rabbis surrounded the Tetragrammaton [...]

Moses Maimonides devoted two chapters to consideration of the Tetragrammaton, as opposed to only one on the name 'I am who I am'. Thomas, although he does not share the extreme apophaticism of Maimonides, appears to have used his exegesis to suggest the Tetragrammaton as the most suitable name for God. For Maimonides the term 'Tetragrammaton' is unique as a divine name because it signifies the Creator's substance rather than the works or the actions. It is the peculiar name of God, God's proper name, a 'separated name' (nomen separatum). As its etymology is unknown it is not shared with any other creatures. Maimonides's concern with

65 Cohon, The Name of God, 583.
66 Ibid., 592.
the sanctity of the name – he identifies other names for the divinity as inferior in sanctity – leads him to make a prodigious statement: "Because of its sacredness it was uttered only in the sanctuary by the holy priests when giving their blessing and by the high priest on the Day of Atonement." That this holy (sacred) name was only to be uttered by holy priests makes one wonder "did the uttering of the name make the priests holy" or "are holy words restricted to recitation by holy people"? The implications of one’s response are either frightening, if one opts for the first solution, or carry an awesome responsibility, and lead inevitably to a form of donatism, in the second. Hence adopting the first reading – that the uttering of holy words, in a strictly theological context or a more properly prayer/liturgical situation, make the one pronouncing the words holy – makes the search for good language about God an imperative.

This is what we are trying to claim was Thomas’ belief, one we suggest may have been inherited from his reading of Maimonides. For Maimonides the Tetragrammaton “designates the very reality of God in such a way that nothing else is signified by it”. As indicated in the proceeding article Thomas was aware of the unique nature of this term for “if any name were given to signify God not as to God’s nature but as to God’s ‘suppositum’, (God’s unique subjectivity) accordingly as God is considered as ‘this something’, that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps (forte) the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew.”

Torrell suggests that the “perhaps” may “convey a certain complexity about the true meaning of this name.” The name itself remains a secret leading Maurer to suggest that as this is of little assistance to a theologian wishing to illumine the contents of faith Thomas doesn’t devote much attention to it. “It occurs exactly where it is needed, at the point where he is looking for a personal name of God that is shared by no one else, that has no known etymology, and

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67 Ibid., 597.
68 Maurer, St. Thomas on the Sacred Name, 283.
69 Ibid. Throughout it is notable that Maimonides uses Tetragrammaton and not the Holy Name, YHWH. That Thomas has adapted this practice is indicative of his profound respect both for God and for the tradition which he has inherited from his Jewish brothers.
70 STh I, q. 13, a. 9 c.
that is not derived from creatures." In his search to name God, and hence render the transcendent immanent, Thomas has arrived at a name that is utterly other, transcendent and simultaneously a nomen appellativum.

5. Conclusion

Thomas began life, so tradition tells us, by asking 'What is God?' in the Benedictine monastery of Montecassino. In question 13 of his great Summa Theologiae he tries to name this God, in a sense asking 'who', rather than 'what', is God. The via negativa along which Thomas walks could be said to lead into an ever brightening darkness as "though by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God 'what He is', and thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know God more fully according as many and more excellent of God's effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to God some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and One" (STh I, q. 12, a. 13 ad 1).

A return to the Jewish tradition has proved insightful. S. Cohon observes that "while the Tetragrammaton was revealed by God to Moses, it was believed to have been discovered by the unaided reason of the human. Human intelligence expressing itself in naming objects, found also the name of God." While the term 'unaided' is problematic, the positive understanding of the human intellect when it comes to things divine is undoubtedly familiar to readers of Thomas. Cohon's claim is based on his reading of R. Aha's story about God, the creation of Adam, and the act of naming. R. Aha recounts how Adam named not only the other creatures but also, when asked by the Holy One 'And what is my name?', we read that Adam replied "It is fitting to call Thee Yahweh (= Adonai), for

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72 Maurer, St. Thomas on the Sacred Name, 284.
74 Cohon, The Name of God, 598, 599.
Thou art the Lord of all Thy creatures." R. Aha adds: "The Holy One said, I am Yahweh; that is my name. (Is.42:8) [...] 'that is the name I specified for Myself.' In other words, in naming the Holy One the human intellect is striving, in a sense, to enter into the Divine, to discover how God names God's self, how the Divinity understand its divinity.

Anna Williams, from her reading notes that "the Summa's epistemology is characterised [...] by the alacrity with which this epistemology becomes explicitly Christian in its emphasis on the mind's union with God. If the human mind is bound for union with God, the Summa's epistemology seems equally bent on uniting the quotidian with the paradisial." In the act of naming God, question 13 of the Prima pars, Thomas sees the quotidian, human language entering into the story of the paradisial, the being of the Trinitarian God. This occurs pre-eminently in the use of the term 'Tetragrammaton'. In this way the distinguishing human gift of being able to articulate a name for the Divine leads to the one naming becoming infiltrated by God. For, as Thomas wrote, God gently "constitutes our nature as God instructs the intellect and

75 Cohon, The Name of God, 599.
77 Ghislain Lafont's term "le caractère dynamique de l'Image" suggests, we believe, the message Thomas is trying to articulate. He begins an interesting section entitled "La capacité de Dieu. Naturel et surnaturel dans l'image" in the following way: "Si la perfection de l'être à l'Image devient ressemblance, dans l'assimilation béatifante à Dieu, elle s'enracine dans la nature même de l'esprit, ipsa natura mentis, considérée sous l'angle de son aptitude à connaître et à aimer Dieu." G. Lafont, Structure et méthode dans la Somme Théologique de S. Thomas d'Aquin. Textes et Études Théologiques, Paris 1961, 272-283: 272.
78 "All our knowledge of God is 'ex creaturis' [...]. We know God in relation to God's creatures – that is to say, it is the Creator-creature relation that is the radical analogy. [...] The meaning of the word 'God' is given [...] by trying to communicate to people, to make them recognise, the compulsion we experience in trying to express ourselves in analogical language about God. It is a compulsion rooted in experience, an experience which we try to characterize as that of the relation of the finite to the infinite. [...] It is because we know that there is a God that we know what the word means." C.J.F. Williams, Existence and the Meaning of the Word 'God', in The Downside Review 77 (1959), 53-71: 70.
courts the will, not like a tyrant, but like a teacher who orders all things sweetly (STh II-II, q. 23, a. 2)." Undoubtedly, in the activity of theology, the divine transcendence is rendered immanent so that the many ‘Adams’ seeking to name God may too become godly. This gift of divinisation, when it occurs, will always be gift. Hence, as Thomas himself wrote in his inaugural lecture, at the beginning of his journey to know and to name God, theologians must always "pray that Christ will grant it to us. Amen."


FORWARD TO VATICAN I
Proving the existence of an unknowable God

David B. Burrell, C.S.C.

Having reviewed Denys Turner’s *Faith, Reason and the Existence of God* for *Modern Theology* 21 (2005),¹ and sent my enthusiastic assessment to a bevy of friends and colleagues, I wanted to go on to explore, among this privileged set of friends and colleagues, the neuralgic issue of the ‘univocity of being’, which Scotists demand as the precondition for the rational pursuit of theology, and others of us regard as the door to ‘ontotheology’ and eventually (with Maimonides) to idolatry!

But first to Denys Turner’s thesis: it is quite straightforward, though its implementation is philosophically astute and persuasive. In that respect, it is reminiscent of John Milbank’s *Theology and Social Theory* (1992), while the thesis is developed in vigorous dialogue with Milbank. Turner contends (against most contemporary philosophical theologians) that the insistence of Vatican Council I “that God, the source and end of all things, can be known with certainty from the consideration of created things, by the natural power of human reason” (1870) is not only true, but must be accepted if our faith is to mean anything in the larger human arena, which he identifies as the very point of the Vatican statement. Moreover, he supplies the therapy appropriate to philosophical inquiry, tracing our spontaneous opposition to this insistence to a view of reason which cannot countenance the range of reason native to Aquinas’ mode of inquiry. Indeed, he insists that an enlightenment set of presumptions about reason forced many to reject the claim in question: whatever reason can conclude must, by that very fact, be

circumscribed within the presumed limits of reason, so the God we
corresponding cannot be demonstrated. Yet Turner proceeds to show us
how, as Aquinas employs reason, a rational proof can conclude to an
object which it realizes it cannot comprehend, in such a way that the
very structure of human reason can anticipate that of faith.

It may help to grasp the novelty of this utterly traditional reading of
Aquinas to contrast it with the bulk of twentieth-century Thomism,
and then see how it culminates a series of recent studies intended to
re-orient that trajectory. The ‘Thomism’ in question stems from Leo
XIII’s rousing encyclical Aeternae Patris (1893) and lasts up to the
emergence of the nouvelle theologie in the 1950’s, followed before
long by the work of Barth’s Catholic interlocutor, Hans Urs von
Balthasar. The signature of this early ‘Thomism’ was a bifurcation
between ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology’, which became institutionalized
in Catholic colleges and universities, along with the imposition on
Aquinas himself of an enlightenment view of reason privileging
certitude over understanding. The penetrating historical work on
Aquinas (of Chenu, Grabmann, and others) contributed to the demise
of this version of Thomism, since that work followed the lineaments
of ressourcement, refusing to content itself with bare conceptual
elaboration. Such contextual studies informed the work of my
mentor in Aquinas, Bernard Lonergan, whose encouragement of our
‘search for understanding’ revealed (by contrast) how much earlier
responses to Leo XIII’s call to return to Aquinas had in fact been
shaped by a Cartesian ‘need for certitude’. Indeed, Lonergan’s
lasting philosophical inspiration had been John Henry Newman –
himself quite opposed to the ‘Thomism’ he encountered on
becoming Catholic.

What has subsequently emerged, largely through the sustained work
of the Thomas Institute in Utrecht, has rather been a keen
appreciation of the way Aquinas himself serves as a model for
transforming philosophical categories into subtle instruments for
elucidating the sui generis ‘distinction’ of creator from creatures.
This shift in focus, from a ‘Thomism’ which hardened lines of
delineation between ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology’ to one more
sensitive to Aquinas’ own practice of interpenetration, can be traced
to a lapidary remark of Josef Pieper, that “the hidden element in the
philosophy of St. Thomas is creation." By which he meant free creation, itself an affirmation of faith; effectively subverting the stark bifurcation between ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology’ endemic to neo-Thomism. The bifurcation inspired institutional arrangements in Catholic universities whereby ‘philosophy’ [=Thomism] was to speak to a wider public, thereby offering an appropriately ‘secular’ way of evangelizing. This never succeeded, of course, since secular interlocutors sensed other premises to be surreptitiously at work, thereby corroborating Pieper’s prescient observation.

Turner’s treatment of Aquinas’ distinctive use of reason culminates a series of salient accounts, including those of David Braine and four Dominicans (among others, including Eugene Rogers): Herbert McCabe, Fergus Kerr, Brian Davies, and Gregory Rocca. What distinguishes Turner’s treatment is his sustained focus on the ineffable creator/creature relation, and the way this difference, differing as it does from any difference among creatures, demands a special set of strategies for properly affirming similarity-cum-difference. Indeed, Aquinas’ strategies of “naming God” “reflect and replicate within reason the tensions between affirmative and negative moments which structure the inner nature of belief itself” (51). Moreover, this internal parallel between the structures of reason and of faith properly distinguishes Aquinas’ philosophical theology from that of Scotus, and also (on Turner’s incisive account) nullifies the standard objections (rooted in Scotus) to arguments employing analogous terms. As he puts it:

Thomas and Scotus part company in that they cannot be said to have the same view of what the participation of human reason in the divine mind entails for reason's natural capacity in respect of its destination. For Thomas, reason so participates in the divine self-knowledge that it can, by the exercise of its distinctively natural capacity of reasoning—that is to say, of properly constructed inference—attain to a conclusion the meaning of which lies beyond any which could stand in a relation of univocity with the created order, which, of itself, is the ambit of reason's own, natural, objects (51).

Here we have a preliminary response to the persistent query regarding to whom it is that Scotus is objecting in his insistence that 'being' (as used of creator and of creatures) must be used univocally. His obvious foil is Henry of Ghent’s account of analogy, but the suspicion lingers that Aquinas is the hidden (and perhaps the real) target. Yet if their views so differ regarding the very capacity of reason, then Scotus' demand for univocity as the precondition for proper reasoning in theology would simply bypass Aquinas' presuppositions. Indeed, in the terms in which Scotus poses it, the move is quite comprehensible and also allows us to see why most philosophers of religion will spontaneously endorse it. For the reason which Turner elaborates as that of Aquinas is decidedly other than the enlightenment view which prevails in current philosophy of religion. Indeed, it is precisely by developing such a view of reason that he can defend the insistence of the first Vatican Council that Catholic believers must believe that the existence of God can be proved.

For standard objections to this demand—paradigmatically those of Karl Barth—simply presume that anything which is a product of reason must be comprehensible to reason, so that whatever god might be demonstrated could hardly be the incomprehensible God of Abrahamic believers. Yet Turner’s extended riposte delineates how the reason to which Aquinas introduces us “reaches its limit not in some final question-stopping answer but rather in a final answer-stopping question. Proof comes into it on the one hand as the

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characteristically and centrally rational activity of demonstrating the necessity of the question [why is there something at all rather than nothing?], and on the other as the demonstration of the impossibility of taking full rational possession of what must count as its answer. For the answer could not have the form of a knowable ‘something’.” Turner calls this exercise of reason “kenotic”, for as it were from “below” it completes itself in its self-emptying, apophatic, depletion in that which is “above it” (232-3). Put more simply: presuming reason cannot negotiate the difference between creator and creatures without neutralizing, it overlooks the sophisticated ways which reason itself has of delineating how this difference differs from differences between creatures. Echoing both Kathryn Tanner and Robert Sokolowski, he notes how “Augustine’s sense of the divine ‘otherness’ is such as to place it, in point of transcendence, closer to my creaturehood than it is possible for any creatures to be to each other. For creatures are more distinct from each other than God can possibly be to any of them” (214).6 Furthermore, since “the difference between God and creatures cannot stand on the same logical ground as differences between creatures stand on,” he counters Scotus’ insistence on univocity by insisting that “no a fortiori case seems warranted that, since there are objections to arguments across genera [from Aristotle], even if successful, they must apply all the more to suppositious arguments for God. Hence it is a logically open question whether argument can get you ‘across’ the gap” (214-5).

The “gap”, of course, cannot be imagined or articulated extensionally, as Kathryn Tanner has reminded us, yet Scotus’ equal insistence that “were being not a univocal concept, no science of metaphysics would be possible” leads him to conclude that “the primacy of being as a univocal concept [becomes] the necessary condition for metaphysics, for any language about God and for any science of theology.”7 So Mary Beth Ingham, with which Richard Cross concurs, in his book (note 4) as well as in a personal communication regarding Denys Turner’s arguments: “It’s always seemed to me inconsistent of Thomas to accept both that theology is

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7 Mary Beth Ingham, o.c., 47, 39.
a science and that there’s no univocity in religious language. I’m quite happy, for myself, for there to be no univocity in religious language. But if that’s the case, theology will have to be practiced very differently from the way Aquinas practises it.” Clearly what both authors are presupposing is a univocal meaning for ‘science’, while Rudi te Velde in his recent publication identifies the work of “the Thomas Institute at the University of Utrecht [as having] developed a way of reading the theology of Thomas presented as a consistent negative theology.”8 Indeed, one of this group [Harm Goris] has shown how Aquinas displaces Ibn Sina’s crucial distinction of necessary from contingent being to focus more directly on the activity of creating, as at once distinguishing the creator from all else while linking them as well.9 Yet a ‘science’ utilizing the sui generis notion of causality which must characterize “the emanation of all of being from the universal cause of being” (STh I, q. 44, a. 5) will hardly be using ‘cause’ in a fashion univocal with causes within the universe; that is, with what we call ‘science’ could understand a cause to be. So it will be that anyone familiar with ‘the way Aquinas practises’ theology could never imagine his intent to illustrate how theologia could be a scientia resulting in a ‘science’ on all fours with other sciences.

Indeed, some fascinating recent work on Aquinas is intent on showing how he must transform Aristotelian definitions and categories to achieve this explicit intent: to retain enough structural similarity with ‘science’ as Aristotle conceived it to show that theology qualifies, but never to demand that the resulting ‘science’ fit a template. This is what a ‘consistent negative theology’ will demand, once one identifies creation as the founding activity, with the resulting transformation of Aristotelian substance (‘what exists in itself’ by contrast with accidents) into what exists ‘in relation to its source’: esse ad creatorem.

So what Aquinas had to develop, through the way he practices the art of reasoning proper to theology, is a way of reasoning which respects difference, teaching us how to discern relevant differences, and so

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8 Rudi te Velde, Aquinas on God. The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae, Aldershot 2006, 73.
refine our native capacities to employ key terms analogously. If the only alternatives are univocity or equivocity, Scotus would be right. But ordinary language use displays terms used evaluatively (and therefore analogously), which we learn how to use in practical reasoning, as Jesus did in reminding univocally-minded Pharisees that he “came to save not the just but sinners.” So the initial step into the kingdom he announced will involve foregoing any empirical way of identifying either group, thereby suggesting quite different norms governing self-knowledge and practice, but ones intelligible to any practiced agent. Similar things could be said of the ‘science of metaphysics’, since the univocal notion of being which Scotists contend can alone ground such a ‘science’ must itself be so thin that it is doubtful if it could ‘ground’ any substantive inquiry. Indeed, there can be no answer to the pseudo-query: “How many things are there in the room?” any more than one can find a generic animal in the local animal shelter.

Returning to the vexatious metaphor of the “gap”, Denys Turner positively identifies the “kenotic” exercise of reason (needed for a “consistent negative theology” [teVelde]) as “proto-sacramental”: it is in the esse or “actuality” of creatures, “their deepest reality, that creatures reveal the Creator who has brought them to be, ex nihilo, so that as the questioning gets closer and closer to God, it gets deeper and deeper into, not further distanced from, the creature” (256-7). Rational discourse of this sort becomes “proto-sacramental” as it attempts to delineate “the difference between a created and an uncreated world [which] is no difference at all in so far as concerns how you describe it. [...] The only difference it makes is all the difference to everything” (257-8). Yet that peculiar difference is also the “foundation of the very possibility of [...] God’s intimacy to the world as Creator, [which in turn] is the foundation of that other intimacy of God to creation which is the incarnation” (258). So a reason which keeps attempting to articulate this peculiar difference deserves to be called “proto-sacramental” in the strongest sense. Moreover, in the other two Abrahamic faiths, al-Ghazali and Maimonides both argued that only a free creation could render possible the ‘coming down’ of the Qur’an to Muhammad or the giving of the Torah to Moses. Denys Turner has identified the deeper reason for this internal connection between the deliverances of faith
and of reason: the very capacity of reason to reason to a termination which shows itself to transcend the categories native to reason. Enlightenment reason, *ex professo*, was restricted (either on Kant's terms or the empiricists') to its categories, so its deliverances are inherently 'categorical', whereas the exercise of reason most illustrative of this further reach lies in the judicious use of analogical language. So a reason which professes not to be able to execute such a reach will also deny the propriety of analogous discourse. But rather than attempt to delegitimize analogous discourse *a priori*, one needs only to attend to "the way Aquinas practises it" to find illuminating ways of proceeding in these matters. We are fortunate to find in Denys Turner's most recent work a diagnosis of this practice which exposes the genius of Aquinas' adaptation of philosophical reason to theological ends.
1. Study and research at the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht

At the beginning of the year under review, i.e. on 18 February 2005, the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht organised a book-symposium on the occasion of the publication of the eleventh volume of the series *Publications of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht*: Barbara Roggema, Marcel Poorthuis, Pim Valkenberg (eds.), *The Three Rings. Textual Studies in the historical triologue of Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (Leuven/Peeters 2005). Ninety people attended this event, which took place at the ‘Boothzaal’ in the brand new building of the Utrecht university library, opposite the Thomas Instituut. Prof.dr. Judith Frishman (KTU), prof.dr. Nasr Abû Zayd (University for Humanistics, Utrecht) and prof. dr. Peter Nissen (Radboud University Nijmegen) discussed several questions, including: in respect of your personal faith, how do you value the common legacy in the Netherlands summarized by ‘the three rings’ at this day and age? Are there essential viewpoints in your religious tradition against the risk of repeating denunciations of the past? Which aspects of your religious tradition refer to a common approach which – in our days – is not feasible anymore but which – as a testimony of the Abrahamic forum – would contribute to modern society? A lively discussion concluded this book-symposium.

Members of the research group *Onderzoeksgroep Thomas van Aquino* convened seven times in 2005, each time on the first Monday of the month. Parts of dissertations by junior research fellows were discussed, as well as preliminary versions of papers that would later be presented at the conference of the institute in December. A number of meetings were spent on reading texts by Thomas Aquinas and on the preparation of the forthcoming conference.
2. Research program 2005-2010

At the end of 2004, the first research program of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht "The theology of Thomas Aquinas, its sources and its influence on subsequent theology" was concluded. In 2005, dr. Henk Schoot and prof. dr. Herwi Rikhof launched a new programme under the title: "The hidden presence of God in Scripture and Sacrament in the context of Thomas Aquinas", which concentrates on Thomas Aquinas and on the subjects of scripture and sacrament.

In its current form, the programme is a continuation of earlier research into the theology of Thomas and the reception of his theology, which – over the years – has developed increasingly into a program that concentrates on the theology of Thomas and its relevance for current theological discussions. Therefore, in the new program Thomas' theology is studied in view of its contribution to these discussions. The field of research is the theology of Thomas Aquinas. The guiding principle is systematic theological and canonical juridical in character. The overall theme of the hidden presence of God is studied in four related projects and is related to the methodical features that have become characteristic of the 'Utrecht' approach: attention to language, to negative theology of Thomas, to the biblical nature of his thought and to the nexus mysteriorum.

The program includes the following main projects:
- Theology of the Trinity: a reading of Thomas in relation to the current renaissance of the theology of the Trinity;
- The God of the medieval Arabic philosophers: doctrine of God in view of the inter-religious dialogue;
- Christ-revelation and the religions: Christology in view of the medieval inter-religious dialogue;
- Sacrament and creation: the sacramental presence of God in marriage, sacrament and creation (this is a interdisciplinary project of systematic theology and canon law).

Two PhD-projects are related to this:
- Thomas's commentary on John;
- The *Pugio Fidei* (a key publication in the inter-religious dialogue in the 13th century).

Three external PhD-projects are also linked to the main projects of the programme: two deal with sacramental theology – especially the Eucharist – and one deals with the doctrine of God and the *imago Dei*.

Every five years, an international conference is organised, during which the topics of the programme are presented to and discussed with an international forum. National and international recognition of the quality of the institute and its research is expressed in the invitation to members, who are invited to contribute to books and conferences, to give guest-lectures and conduct summer courses, to act as editors in various editorial boards or to become a visiting scholar.

The Thomas Foundation has acquired funds for establishing a chair for the study of the theology of Thomas Aquinas. The holder of this chair, be it part time and be it probably for a limited period of time, will be able to raise the profile of the programme.

The various research projects give the opportunity for interdisciplinary discussions, both within the institute and within a broader academic setting, including areas discussing the relationship of systematic theology – exegesis, Christianity-Judaism, theology – philosophy, (medieval) history.

3. **Conference 2005**

From 15 to 17 December 2005 inclusive, the *Thomas Instituut te Utrecht* organised its third international conference at the ISVW conference centre at Leusden (Holland) near Utrecht. Fifty participants from twelve countries (Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Iran, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, USA, UK and Switzerland) discussed the issue of “Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas” during this three-day conference.

An influential, but rather debatable interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’ lasting cultural contribution focuses on the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Such a distinction may serve the interests of human autonomy, human rationality, the development of the sciences and the dialogue with non-Christian partners. But it may serve to marginalize church and religion in
response to important cultural forces, and to deeply secularize human understanding of the ‘self’ and of society.

Over the past decades, however, both philosophers and theologians have formulated an interpretation of Aquinas that is quite different. It focuses on the Christian and theological thrust of Aquinas’ authorship, and is in search of both God’s presence and absence in our world. There is no absolute, clear-cut opposition or simple contrast between God and the human world, nor can God be reduced to a human world. This is a negative formula. How can we best approach this negative formula? Are there any sound strategies to elucidate this formula and what would those strategies entail? How can Aquinas help us recognize and interpret God’s presence in our own world?

During the conference, scholars from different backgrounds and disciplines faced the challenge. For this, four subject areas had been selected: Aquinas’ understanding of God, his teaching on creation and on grace and life eternal, and his approach to Christ and his sacraments. The programme provided four clusters of key lectures, which were followed by papers, related to the same subject-areas.

The conference was officially opened in the afternoon by the director of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, Herwi Rikhof. Following this, Conor Cunningham (Nottingham) presented the first key lecture on the basis of the topic of recollection. In addition to Cunningham’s originally platonic understanding of recollection, Rudi Te Velde (Amsterdam-Tilburg) juxtaposed this with another platonic element: he proposed an understanding of participation which may help to resolve the dichotomy of transcendence and immanence in relation to God. During the evening, three parallel sessions were held, each with two papers in connection with the topic of the doctrine of God. Various presenters from Europe and one from Iran entered into a lively discussion.

The second day of the conference was started with two papers on Aquinas’ theology of creation. Gregory Rocca (Berkeley) elaborated on the topic of creatio ex nihilo as a key to unlock transcendence and immanence, while Harm Goris (Utrecht) discussed God’s omnipresence. Aquinas’ theology of creation was also the theme of the three following parallel sessions.
In the afternoon, key-lectures focused on 'Christ and his sacraments'. The first lecture was held by Bruce Marshall (Dallas). He showed in which way Thomas' Christology and his understanding of Israel communicate. After that Henk Schoot (Utrecht) discussed the doctrine of redemption: Thomas' understanding of satisfaction is determined by his understanding of love. Cardinal Simonis of the archdiocese of Utrecht attended this paper and expressed his appreciation for the sound Thomas research as the topic of this conference.

In the evening, the conference party moved to the new Utrecht university library, where Emile Ramakers (Maastricht) presented a paper on the oldest images of Thomas' life, a fresco, which is in Maastricht. Following this, the conference party attended a guided tour of the university building and a presentation during which Hans Mulder, the Conservator of Rare Imprints, introduced the key treasures of one of the oldest university libraries in the Netherlands.

The third and last day of the conference was started with three parallel sessions on the theme of 'Christ and his sacraments'. In each session a (junior) researcher of the Thomas Instituut entered into discussion with a participant from the United States.

Ensuing, Hans-Christian Schmidbaur (Lugano) gave a paper on friendship of God and the image of God in Thomas' thinking, while Herwi Rikhof (Utrecht) showed in his paper - which included both scriptural commentary and Thomas' systematic works on adoptive sonship - that Thomas interprets this as in a thoroughly trinitarian way. This part of the conference on the theme of 'Grace and Life eternal' was complemented by two parallel sessions with speakers from Poland, the USA and Italy.

A plenary session concluded the afternoon, with the eight keynote speakers chaired by David Burrell (Notre Dame), looking back at the conference. The exchange of many different approaches and fields of research and the discussions held from theological, philosophical and historical perspectives, was experienced as encouraging and enriching. They took away many blind spots. In addition to Thomas Aquinas, also other church fathers, teachers and theologians appeared to have been topics of discussions. Both participants and organisers observed that all expectations had been met. The excellent atmosphere and the quality of
the open way in which discussions were held had even surpassed the expectations of many participants.

Preparations are being made for a book in which edited versions of the plenary sessions and a number of other contributions will be published. Some contributions to the conference are published in this *Jaarboek Thomas Instituut te Utrecht 2005*.

4. **The Board of the Institute and the Foundation**

Most of the issues that have been mentioned above were discussed in a meeting of the Board of the Institute, which convened on 14 April. There were no changes to the composition of the Board of the Institute.

The Board of the Thomas Foundation convened on 12 April and on 9 December. The Board discussed the requests for financial support and concentrated on the preparations for the establishment of a chair extraordinary for research into Thomas' theology at the *Thomas Instituut te Utrecht*.

5. **Jaarboek Thomas Instituut te Utrecht**

The *Jaarboek Thomas Instituut te Utrecht 2004* was timely published in 2005. The Editorial Board convened on 5 April and 17 November. There were no personnel changes in the Editorial Board.

6. **Series of Publications**

In the year under review, the eleventh volume was published in the series of the institute: Barbara Roggema, Marcel Poorthuis, Pim Valkenberg (eds.) *The Three Rings - Textual Studies in the historical triologue of Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, Publications of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, Volume XI, Leuven/Peeters 2005, 297 pp. The book was presented at a symposium on 18 February.
7. Members of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht

31 December 2005

Catholic Theological University Utrecht
Staff
Prof. dr. P. van Geest
Dr. H.J.M.J. Goris
Prof. dr. H.W.M. Rikhof
Dr. H.J.M. Schoot
Dr. A.M.G. Van den Bossche
Prof. dr. F.J.H. Vosman
Prof. dr. J.B.M. Wissink

Candidates for a Doctorate
Drs. S. Mangnus
Drs. F.A. Steijger
Drs. S. Wiersma

Tilburg Faculty of Theology
Staff
Prof. dr. K.-W. Merks
Prof. dr. R.A. te Velde
(University of Amsterdam, Philosophy)

Catholic University of Nijmegen
Staff
Dr. P.J.J.M. Bakker (Philosophy)
Prof. dr. H.A.G. Braakhuis
(Philosophy)
Dr. C.J.W. Leget (UMC St. Radboud, Ethics)
Prof. dr. P.J.M. van Tongeren
(Philosophy)
Prof. dr. P.G.J.M. Raedts
(History)
Dr. W.G.B.M. Valkenberg
(Theology)
Dr. A.C.M. Vennix (Philosophy)
Prof. dr. mr. B.P.M. Vermeulen
(Law)
8. Research programmes and research projects in 2005

The projects referred to are carried out by members of the institute. The research programmes consist of several projects.

The hidden presence of God in Scripture and Sacrament seen in the light of Thomas Aquinas
(Catholic Theological University of Utrecht)

The God of the Medieval Arabic Philosophers
-H.J.M.J. Goris

"Ut credentes vitam habeatis". Faith in Thomas Aquinas' In Ioannem
-S. Mangnus

The Mystery of the Trinity
-H.W.M. Rikhof

Christ-Revelation and the Religions
-H.J.M. Schoot

God's Hidden Presence in the Sacrament
-F.A. Steijger
The Concept of Trinity and Reconstruction of Identity in Christian Theology of Interreligious Dialogue (also part of the research programme of the Faculty of Theology at the Catholic University of Nijmegen, entitled: ‘Religious identity interactions in a plural and secularized society’)  
-W.G.B.M. Valkenberg

Sacrament and Creation  
-A.M.G. Van den Bossche

The meaning of the term ‘passion’ (and its connotations) in handbooks of moral theology  
-F.J.H. Vosman

The Pugio Fidei by Raimundus Martini (1220-1284)  
-S. Wiersma

Transcendence and Transcendentals  
(Tilburg Faculty of Theology)

Current meaning of Aquinas’ ethics  
-K.-W. Merks

Metaphysics in Aquinas and the Thomist tradition  
-R.A. te Velde

Individual projects

Gabriel Biel, a devout theologian. Research into the interrelatedness of spirituality of the Devotio Moderna and academic theology in the work of Gabriel Biel  
-P. van Geest

Den Tod im Leben sehen. Martin Luthers Beitrag zu einem erneuerten Umgang mit Tod und Sterben in unserer Zeit  
-S. Gradl

Spirituality in palliative care  
-C.J.W. Leget

Subject and normativity (programme)  
-P.J.M. van Tongeren

The question of the eternity of the world in Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia  
-P.L. van Veldhuijsen

Design of a Practical Ecclesiology  
-J.B.M. Wissink
9. **Publications in 2005**

This list contains all publications by members of the Thomas Instituut in so far as they include Thomas Aquinas as a topic or a topic in relation to his life and works. It also contains all publications by members whose research has been located at the Thomas Instituut.

**Scientific publications**


Van den Bossche, A.M.G. - From the Other’s Point of View. The challenge of Jean-Luc Marion’s Phenomenology to Theology - L. Boeve, Y. de Maeseneer, S. Van den Bossche (eds.), Religious Experience and Contemporary Theological Epistemology (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium CLXXXVIII), Leuven/Peeters-Leuven University Press (2005) 61-82


Velde, R.A. te - De begeerte naar weten: Thomas en Bonaventura over de Boom der Kennis - Timo Slootweg (ed.), In de schaduw van de Boom der Kennis - Budel/Damon (2005) 71-89


Professional and/or popular publications


Merks, K.W. - Von ‘multikultureller’ Toleranz zu ‘interkultureller’ Verständigung - ciens newsletter 1 (September 2005) 1-2


Van den Bossche, A.M.G. - “U hebt het mij gegeven, aan U Heer, geef ik het terug” (GO 234). Over de Kerk als bouwsteen van de ignatiaanse spiritualiteit - Cardoner (2005/1) 20-29

Van den Bossche, A.M.G. - De Bijbel in het huwelijk - Rondom Gezin 26 (2005/2) 66-77


_Academic lectures_

Geest, P.J.J. van - De Regel van Augustinus - Lecture at the ‘Soeterbeeck-Leergang’, Soeterbeeck/Radboud University Nijmegen, 28 May 2005

Geest, P.J.J. van - Augustinus over vriendschap - Lecture at the ‘Oude Abdij’ Drongen, 22 August 2005

Geest, P.J.J. van - Augustine’s thoughts on how God may be represented - Paper read at the conference ‘Iconoclash. Struggle for Research Identity. Second Conference of Church Historians Utrecht’, Utrecht, 24 August 2005

Goris, H.J.M.J. - Theology of the Word in Aquinas and Augustine - Paper read at the conference ‘Aquinas the Augustinian’, Ave Maria University, Napels (Florida), 4 February 2005


Merks, K.-W. - Die theologische Bedeutung des säkularen Staates - Lecture at the symposium ‘Die Rolle der Religion in Recht und politischer Ordnung heute’, Bamberg, 2 July 2005

Rikhof, H.W.M. - Towards a new Dutch late modern devotion. A reflection on a painting - Paper read at a meeting of American Academics, Utrecht, 6 June 2005

Rikhof, H.W.M. - Thomas at Utrecht - Paper read at the conference Letture e Interpretazioni di Tomasso d’Aquino Oggi: Cantieri Aperti, Milan, 13 September 2005


Steijger, F. - Transubstantiation in discussion - Lecture at the conference ‘Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas’, Leusden, 16 December 2005


Velde, R.A. te - De actualiteit van de mythe vanuit het premoderne perspectief: Augustinus en Thomas - Lecture at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, 10 April 2005

Velde, R.A. te - Katholiek in een postchristelijke cultuur - Lecture at the University of Amsterdam, 24 November 2005

Velde, R.A. te - Anselmus - Guestlecture at the seminar on History of Philosophy, International School of Philosophy (ISVW), Leusden, 27 November 2005
Velde, R.A. te - Over het persoonzijn van God - Lecture at the day of studies of the Dutch Society for Philosophy of Religion, 2 December 2005


Wiersma, S. - The Doctrine of the Trinity in Raymundus Martini’s *Pugio Fidei* - Lecture at the conference ‘Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas’, Leusden, 15 December 2005